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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a study of the drafting process for the Hague Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Judgments. It will be demonstrated why the original goal of a broad 
treaty was given up in favor of a draft convention that only applies in international cases 
to exclusive choice of court agreements concluded in civil and commercial matters in the 
business-to-business setting. The reader will get an understanding of how the 
participating nations and interest groups influenced the negotiations and modified the 
outcome of the discussions. Special consideration was given to the matters of intellectual 
property and e-commerce, which were nearly completely excluded from the scope of the 
present draft. The thesis concludes that the project can only succeed if it includes 
business-to-consumer e-commerce transaction issues and intellectual property rights. 
Without the inclusion of these matters into the scope of the Hague Convention, it will 
lose further importance and face the danger of becoming obsolete. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine the following scenario which could have taken place a decade ago: Two scholars 
of Private International Law have a discussion about the biggest challenge this field of 
law has to face in the future. There could have been a lot of different issues both scholars 
would have come up with. Even though it is difficult and highly speculative to guess 
which of the issues deserved the most attention, it can certainly be assumed that a 
convention on jurisdiction and foreign judgments, which is universally acceptable and 
aplicable was at the top of their list. In 1994, the Hague Conference decided to take up 
this work in order to draft such a unifying treaty. The project was soon known as the 
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters. This thesis will analyze this project. A future Hague Jurisdiction and Judgments 
Convention is a great opportunity to unify the law in a field which is not only of legal 
interest but has great ramifications on the legal systems and will affect individuals 
everywhere.  
Although a final Hague Convention on this matter is not yet in force, the outcome 
seems to be foreseeable. The objective of this thesis is to connect the history of the 
negotiation process of the proposed Hague Convention with the discussion of its final 
content in order to provide an understanding of a future result. The thesis will analyze 
how the influence of the major negotiating parties, namely the United States and Europe, 
changed the scope of the Convention in the course of the negotiations. The thesis will 
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describe why, in the end, the United States only agreed to a convention that solely 
covered exclusive choice of court agreements in civil or commercial matters instead of 
adopting a treaty similar to the Brussels Regulation.   
 Special considerations will be given to matters of intellectual property and e-
commerce. These two areas were chosen because they play a prominent role since the 
increasing use of the internet, as one example, has led to a heightened importance of 
intellectual property matters and e-commerce. This thesis will endeavor to explain 
whether and how the proposed convention covers these two issues. Each respective 
approach will be analyzed and compared with other possible approaches. The influence 
of the negotiating parties on the final outcome will also be analyzed in this context.  
 Following the introduction in Part I, Part II of this thesis will describe the history 
of the Hague Convention project. This will include a description of what the Hague 
Conference actually is, prior attempts by the Hague Conference on the same subject, and 
the existing framework regarding jurisdiction and judgments in Europe and in the United 
States. A detailed description of the history of the negotiations itself is also included. The 
different perspectives of the most important negotiating parties will try to give an 
understanding for the way the different delegations developed and influenced the 
discussions. Part III examines the structure and the scope of the Preliminary Draft 
Convention and the first complete draft on the subject issued by the Hague Conference. 
The structural portion concentrates on the question of what a mixed convention style is 
and which advantages such an approach has compared to single and double convention 
schemes. Next, the scope of the Preliminary Draft Convention will be examined chapter 
by chapter since this draft was the archetype for the following negotiation and discussion 
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processes. Part IV concentrates on the development of the project during and after the 
June 2001 Diplomatic Conference. Changes in the convention text, new approaches and 
the latest developments will be investigated. Part V deals with the preparations that were 
made for the June 2005 Diplomatic Conference. It provides a detailed description of the 
key provisions of the April 2004 Draft which is the most recent draft issued by the Hague 
Conference. Part VI deals with the special consideration of intellectual property and e-
commerce issues in the discussion, which reiterates the importance of the negotiation 
process. However, this time it is looked upon from the viewpoint of intellectual property 
and e-commerce. The issue of consumer protection receives special consideration in the 
section on e-commerce since both fields are inseparably connected. A number of 
approaches in various countries as well as different positions in the negotiations will be 
described before a final conclusion is drawn in Part VII of the thesis.    
 The thesis will conclude that the negotiating parties are proceeding in the right 
direction by drafting, signing, and ratifying a treaty that only covers exclusive choice of 
court agreements in civil and commercial matters in the business-to-business setting if 
more controversial issue will be added later. The adding of the so-called second stage 
issues is of major importance for the success of the project in the long run.  
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORY OF THE PROJECT 
 
A. The Hague Conference 
On 12 September 1893, the Dutch government called a conference, with the intention of 
concentrating primarily on family law and succession,1 and the unification of rules of 
private international law.2 Thirteen states accepted the invitation and sent their 
government representatives to The Hague, not only in 1893 but also in 1894, 1900, and 
1904.3 The loose structure of this conference was given a firm legal basis after World 
War II by an agreement made between 16 European states and Japan.4 In October 1951, 
these states affirmed the usage established by the Dutch government since 1893 and 
indicated permanent character of the conference by giving it the name: “The Hague 
Conference on Private International Law.”5 Currently, the Hague Conference is an 
intergovernmental organization with sixty two member states, which include all 
European Union member states and the United States.6 According to Article 1 of its 
                                                 
  1 See Kurt Lipstein, One Hundred Years of Hague Conference on Private International Law, 42 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 553, 557 (1993). 
  2  See Kurt H. Nadelmann, The United States Joins the Hague Conference on Private International Law, A 
History with Comments, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 291, 292 (1965).  
  3   See supra note 1.  
  4   See id. at 558. 
  5  Id. For a summary of the work of the Hague Conference, see id. at 553; for general information on The 
Hague Conference see http://www.hcch.net.  
  6 Membership as of January 21, 2005: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, 
Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, 
Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela; for a detailed list 
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Statute the Hague Conference is organized to promote “the progressive unification of the 
rules of private international law.”7 Conferences are called every four years, but 
extraordinary sessions are possible as well. In its history, the Hague Conference dealt 
with the topics of procedure, family matters, succession, commercial matters, torts and 
conflict of laws.8 The United States has been a member since 15 October 1964.9 The 
Hague Conference, with its member states on all continents, seems to offer a solid basis 
for conventions for the unification of law in certain fields not only regionally, but also 
worldwide. Thus, the interest in an instrument unifying the law with respect to 
jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments that would be universally acceptable brought 
the negotiating parties to The Hague. But is the goal of a universally applicable and 
workable convention in this field achievable and realistic? What would be an alternative 
to a Hague Conference Convention? 
Negotiations within the Hague regime require multiple levels of compromise from 
its members. On the one hand is the U.S. and its abstinence from any treaty unifying rules 
of jurisdiction and enforcement. On the other hand are the nations which adhere to the 
Brussels and Lugano Conventions.10 In terms of experience, both sides have a long 
                                                                                                                                                 
of all 64 Member States see http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=states.listing (last visited January 
21, 2005). 
  7  The text of the Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law is available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.pdf&cid=29 (last visited January 21, 2005). 
  8   See supra note 1 at 559.    
  9 See http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=states.details&sid=76 (last visited January 21, 2005); for 
general information regarding the U.S. participation in the Hague Conference see Peter H. Pfund & 
Georg Taft, Congress’ Role in the International Unification of Private Law, 16 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
671 (1986). Peter H. Pfund, of the Office of the Legal Advisor at the Department of State, Office of 
Private International Law, has provided periodic reports on the work of that office. See, e.g., Peter H. 
Pfund, International Unification of Private Law: A Report on U.S. Participation 1987-88, 22 INT’L 
LAW 1157 (1988); Peter H. Pfund, Annual Report, International Unification of Private Law: A Report 
on United States Participation, 20 INT’L LAW 623 (1986). For historical information see Elliott E. 
Cheatham & Harold G. Maier, Private International Law and its Sources, 22 VAND. L. REV. 27 (1968); 
Kurt H. Nadelmann, supra note 2.     
 10  See infra part II.B.2. 
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history of dealing with international civil procedure. But what about smaller nations with 
less experience in such matters? Negotiations within the limits of the Hague Conference 
would, undoubtedly, mean that such inexperienced nations would be involved in the 
process of finding an agreement. Some authors hold the view that their involvement 
would not only complicate such an agreement process, but would rather make the 
bargaining of a final text nearly impossible.11 This thought led some academics to suggest 
that bilateral negotiations exclusively between the U.S. and Europe could achieve a 
reasonable result more efficiently, since they displayed common interests and similar 
social, political and economic cultures.12 While this argument admittedly has substance, a 
very important question arises nonetheless. Should not the opportunity to involve more 
inexperienced nations be worth the associated risk of more complicated negotiations? In 
the opinion supported in this thesis, the answer to this question is a clear yes. The only 
situation in which the suggestion of bilateral discussions should be considered is if the 
current Hague project fails due to circumstances not involved with the differences 
between the US and European legal systems. In that case, such problems could not be 
resolved in a bilateral setting either.  
 
B. Previous Attempts and Existing Framework  
Before analyzing the new attempts regarding the unification of private international law, 
it seems useful to emphasize the existing framework.  
 
                                                 
 11 For such a pessimistic view see ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE 
QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS, ESSAYS ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 109 (1996); see also 
Friedrich K. Juenger, A Hague Judgments Convention?, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 111, 121 (1998). 
 12  See, e.g., Juenger, id at 121.  
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1. Previous Attempts for Unification 
Work on unifying the law regarding jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments is not a 
new matter for the Hague Conference. In 1969, the first attempts of unification were 
made by concluding both the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters13 and the Convention on the Recognition of 
Divorces and Legal Separations.14 The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters came into effect on February 1, 
1971. However, the treaty faced problems that made it impossible for this convention to 
survive. Only Cyprus, The Netherlands, Portugal and Kuwait became parties, but none of 
them ever deposited the bilateral agreements that were, according to the convention, 
necessary to make the treaty operable.15 The later convention, the Divorce Recognition 
Convention, turned out to be just as unsuccessful since only eighteen countries, mostly 
European, ratified or acceded to it.16 Even though these early attempts were not 
successful, it was clear that unification in the fields of jurisdiction and enforcement could 
offer great benefits in various ways. However, an agreement had yet to be achieved not 
only within Europe, but in other parts of the world. What followed were unification 
attempts between countries that had at least similar interests and legal backgrounds.     
 
                                                 
 13 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, Hague Conference on Private International Law (Feb. 1, 1971), reprinted in 15 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 362 (1967), also available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.pdf&cid=78 (last 
visited January 21, 2005). 
 14  Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations, Hague Conference on Private 
International Law (June 1, 1970), reprinted in 8 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 31 (1969), also available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=80 (last visited January 21, 2005).  
 15 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, supra note 13, art. 28. 
 16 A list of all the countries that have ratified or acceded to the treaty is available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=80 (last visited January 21, 2005).    
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2. Unification in the EU 
A close look at the various approaches of European countries regarding the jurisdiction 
issue is enough to understand why unification within the EU is more than reasonable and 
finds common interest. For example, in order to find jurisdiction over a non-resident, it is 
enough to base this solely on assets located in the forum according to Germany’s Law of 
Civil Procedure.17 By contrast, the French Civil Code18 allows national courts to hear 
nearly any case were the plaintiff is French, regardless of whether the person in question 
is a resident or not.19 Moreover, a French defendant can insist on being sued in his own 
country, and French courts will not enforce a judgment against him provided he has not 
consented to a foreign jurisdiction.20    
In order to protect their citizens against extraterritorial reach and to achieve 
predictability, the six original member states of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) decided to unify their laws of jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments by 
adopting the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.21 The importance of the Brussels 
Convention is reflected in Article 63 of the Convention which requires that any state 
becoming a member of the European Community must become a party to the Brussels 
                                                 
 17  § 23 Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO). 
 18  Code Civil. 
 19  C. civ. art. 14. 
 20  Id. art. 15. 
 21  Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1998 O.J. (C 27) 1 (consolidated and updated version of the 1968 Convention 
and the Protocol of 1971, following the 1996 accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of 
Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden) [hereinafter Brussels Convention], also available  at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1998/c_027/c_02719980126en00010033.pdf  
(last visited January 21, 2005). 
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Convention.22 Consequently, the Brussels Convention has also become effective in all 
member states that joined the European Union. The idea behind this convention was to 
take another step towards the unified market among the several European countries.23  
However, the Brussels Convention lost its importance on May 1, 1999, when the 
Amsterdam Treaty24 became effective for the European Union member states. According 
to this treaty, the competence for coordination of internal rules on jurisdiction and 
recognition of judgments now lay with the Community institutions. The institutions acted 
on the new possibility immediately. The Council issued Council Regulation (EC) No. 
44/2001,25 a Community regulation that replaced the Brussels Convention. While the 
numbering of the articles has changed, the regulation contains rules that are substantially 
similar to the Brussels Convention, providing a comprehensive approach to jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments. The general jurisdictional pillars can 
be summarized as follows: Both the convention and the regulation set forth that persons 
domiciled in a member state may be sued in the courts of another member state. As far as 
commercial contracts are concerned the proper forum can normally be found in the 
“place of performance of the obligation in question.”26 In tort cases, “the place where the 
                                                 
 22 Brussels Convention, id. art. 63. However, the rules set forth in the Brussels Convention were not 
codified directly into the member states statutory systems. Member states were required to enact laws 
that gave effect to the objective of the Brussels Convention.  
 23  See Sean D. Murphy, Negotiation of Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments, 95 AM. 
J. INT’L. L. 418, 419 (2001).  
 24  Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997).  
 25 Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of Dec. 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 [hereinafter Brussels 
Regulation or Council Regulation No. 44/2001], also available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_012/l_01220010116en00010023.pdf (last visited January 21, 2005). The 
Council Regulation No. 44/2001 was finalized on Dec. 22, 2000, and became effective on March 1, 
2002. The Regulation does not apply in Denmark. Council Regulation No. 44/2001, pmbl. ¶21. 
However, Denmark continues to be subject to the Brussels Treaty vis-a-vis the other European Union 
member states. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 22. 
 26  Brussels Convention, supra note 21, art. 5 (1); Brussels Regulation, supra note 25, art. 5 (1)(a). 
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harmful event occurred” determines the proper jurisdiction.27 If a person is one among a 
bigger number of defendants he may sue “where any of them is domiciled.”28 In a 
consumer contract setting, the consumer has the choice between an action in his domicile 
or in that of the supplier. The supplier on the other hand is only able to bring an action in 
the consumers domicile.29   
The European Union has also adopted the Lugano Convention,30 which 
incorporates the ideas of the Brussels Convention and makes an effort to include non-
member states into the common European Union jurisdiction and recognition practice. 
The EU stated that the convention was “open to accession by [...] other States which have 
been invited to accede upon a request made by one of the Contracting States to the 
depository State.”31 That no non-European state has requested accession so far is due to 
the fact that such a state may only adhere if the existing parties to the Lugano Convention 
unanimously agree to its participation.32 Such an agreement is difficult to obtain, 
however, since the approaches in terms of jurisdiction and recognition in most of the 
important non-European Union trading partners are quite different.33   
 
                                                 
 27  Brussels Convention, id., art. 5 (3); Brussels Regulation, id., art. 5 (3). 
 28  Brussels Convention, id., art. 6(1); Brussels Regulation, id., art. 6(1). 
 29  Brussels Convention, id., art. 14;  Brussels Regulation, id., art. 16(1) and (2). Art. 13 of the Brussels 
Convention and Art. 15 of the Brussels Regulation determine which contracts qualify as consumer 
contracts. Brussels Convention, id., art. 13; Brussels Regulation, id., art. 15.  
 30  Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1989 
O.J. (L 319) 9 reprinted in 28 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 620 (1989) [hereinafter Lugano Convention]. 
 31  Id. art. 62(1)(b). 
 32  Id. 
 33  Apart from that there is a limited significance of the Lugano Convention since recent accession by most 
of the EFTA states to the EU will bring them within the scope of the Brussels Convention or the 
Council Regulation No. 44/2001.  
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3. United States  
The United States neither ratified the conventions prepared by the Hague Conference34 
nor is it a party to any treaty on the recognition of judgments.35 Despite this, there have 
been some attempts by the United States to unify the law in this field. An earlier effort in 
the 1970s to negotiate a judgments convention between the United States and the United 
Kingdom failed, partially, because of the British government opposition to recognize 
U.S. antitrust judgments36 and because of opposition by the U.K. insurance industry.37 
The British insurance companies were afraid of the enforcement of extensive U.S. jury 
verdicts, punitive damage awards, and antitrust remedies against them in the U.K.38 
Against this background, the importance of successful negotiations of a Hague 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention becomes obvious: such a convention would be 
the first one with the United States as a party.  
 
C. The History of the Negotiations 
1. Different Starting Points  
First, the problems that the delegations faced and the background for the negotiations will 
be discussed before dealing with the actual negotiations. The European countries entered 
the negotiations with a great advantage. There was no doubt among academics and 
practitioners that the Brussels Convention worked so well that the adoption of the parallel 
                                                 
 34  See supra part II.B.1. 
 35 See Ronald A. Brand, Intellectual Property, Electronic Commerce and the Preliminary Hague 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention, 62 U. PITT L. REV. 581, 582 (2001); see also Murphy, supra 
note 23 at 419. 
 36  See P.M. North, The Draft U.K./U.S. Judgments Convention: A British Viewpoint, 1 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 219, 231 (1979). 
 37  See Murphy, supra note 23 at 419. 
 38  See Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of Human Rights 
Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 141, 174 
(2001); see also Juenger, supra note 11 at 113.  
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Lugano Convention by the remaining European Free Trade Association nations was an 
expected consequence.39 The fact that this treaty is a well – functioning arrangement on a 
day – to – day basis, since neither linguistic nor legal barriers can bar the relatively low 
priced enforcement of domestic judgments in other member state countries,40 puts into 
question whether there was a need for a broader convention for these countries.  
Important in this context is the fact that the European Court of Justice has 
rendered about 90 decisions that dealt with problems how to interpret the Brussels 
Convention.41 These decisions are a further contribution to the clarification of the 
Brussels Convention regime and make it more dependable, workable and fully 
developed. These facts are a strong bargaining tool for the European countries. It is 
probable and thoroughly understandable that they will not be willing to give away much 
of their well – functioning system, since most of their major trading partners are already 
included in the existing recognition regime.  
By contrast, the U.S. starting point for negotiations on a future Hague Convention 
is somewhat different. In the United States system there is no clear and rational catalog of 
jurisdictional bases. Regardless of the fact that civil law and even most of the common 
law countries can show a catalog of jurisdictional bases,42 the United States system has to 
                                                 
 39 See Juenger, supra note 11 at 116 (conferring to the Brussels Convention as the “the single most 
important private international law treaty in history“). 
 40  Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for Globetrotting, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1027, 1038 (1995) (stating 
that the practice under the Brussels Convention is even “smother, more efficient, and more satisfactory” 
than American interstate recognition and enforcement). 
 41  See Paul R. Beaumont, A United Kingdom Perspective on the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 
24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 75, 89 (1998). For brief commentary on all those cases see Appendix 2 to 
ALEXANDER E. ANTON & PAUL R. BEAUMONT, CIVIL JURISDICTION IN SCOTLAND: BRUSSELS AND 
LUGANO CONVENTIONS 429-592 (2d. ed. 1995). 
 42  See, e.g., Order 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (England); Supreme Court Rules 1970, part 10 
(N.S.W., Australia). 
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rely on state long arm statutes and Supreme Court case law that is often incoherent.43 The 
landmark court case on this issue is International Shoe Co. v. Washington,44 which sets 
forth the basic principles regarding jurisdiction over legal persons in the U.S. system. 
Even over 50 years after this important decision, it is still not totally clear what are the 
correct guidelines for determining general jurisdiction in the United States.45 Even the 
Supreme Court has difficulty figuring out a terminology looking at prior Supreme Court 
decisions if one compares decisions made by same justices in different cases.46 Because 
of all these reasons, the American jurisdictional law has been referred to as “not fit for 
export.”47  
Under normal circumstances, these facts suggest that the negotiating power of the 
U.S. is not very strong since the U.S. delegation would not have much to contribute. The 
U.S. delegation has made clear on several occasions that negotiations about their present 
system of jurisdictional law is nearly impossible for them. Their hands are tied, so the 
U.S. delegation states, since the case law established by the U.S. Supreme Court is non-
negotiable. The Supreme Court Justices have imposed their mandates as a matter of 
constitutional law. Although one author describes the position to be “regrettable,”48 there 
is a reason for the U.S. delegation taking such a position. Ever since 1877 with the case 
of Pennoyer  v. Neff,49 the Supreme Court has set clear that all its disclosures are 
                                                 
 43  Juenger, supra note 11 at 117.  
 44  International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 45  See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). For a critical view 
on the American jurisdictional concept, see Symposium, Fifty Years of International Shoe: The Past and 
Future of Personal Jurisdiction, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 513 (1995).  
 46  Compare, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 note 10 
(1982) (White, J.) (discussing minimum contacts analysis), with Worldwide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 
444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (White, J.) (discussing also minimum contacts analysis).       
 47  Juenger, supra, note 40 at 1038. 
 48  See id. at 1037. 
 49  Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
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controlled by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.50 The Due Process 
Clause puts certain limits on the extension of jurisdiction over defendants that have no 
substantial link to the forum. Therefore, it seems difficult for the United States to accept 
certain grounds of jurisdiction without conflicting with the rules in the U.S. Constitution. 
Tort jurisdiction based solely on the place of the injury are as hard to imagine as contract 
jurisdiction based solely on the place of performance. But these bases of jurisdiction are 
exactly what the nations applying the Brussels or Lugano Convention rely on.  
Despite the US’s supposedly inflexible position at the beginning of the 
negotiations, it was still untimely to predict whether or not the US would compromise on 
any of its established rules or approaches. If the U.S. delegation showed some willingness 
to shorten but in no case to lengthen the domestic long arm, or if it failed to recognize 
foreign judgments that did not fit within the limits of the Due Process jurisprudence 
established by the U.S. Supreme Court, they are disregarding the concerns of their 
negotiating partners in civil law countries. Jurisdiction based on doing business or 
minimum contacts, which in Europe are often considered vague and unpredictable, are at 
least as unfamiliar to Brussels Convention members as their jurisdictional rules are for 
the U.S. This and the fact that the European countries already have a well functioning 
jurisdiction and recognition system also makes it difficult for them to accommodate their 
rules and policies to any changes. Whether this led the delegations of the European 
countries to the conclusion that their “hands are bound” as well is not clear. Thus, the 
starting point for the negotiations seemed to be the following one: both major negotiating 
parties would not be willing to lose large parts of their systems. The European Union 
                                                 
50  Id. at 733. 
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applying a functioning system appeared to have more to offer and was unlikely to change 
a substantial number of their rules. On the other hand, the U.S. could not present a system 
that would work both among the several states within in the U.S. and also among the U.S. 
and other nations. However, the U.S. would still control or at least influence the 
negotiations at least as much as the European delegations. What they had to offer was 
apparent – without the participation of the economically powerful U.S. there will not be a 
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments, since the goal of the 
Hague Conference was to construct a universally acceptable treaty. 
 
2. The Negotiations Prior to the 2001 Draft 
In May 1992, Edwin Williamson, then Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State 
took the step that would be referred to as the original source of all the subsequent 
negotiations to the project here discussed. He wrote the Secretary General of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law proposing that the Conference take up the 
negotiation of a convention that regulates recognition and enforcement of judgments on a 
multinational basis.51 The first response to this letter came in May 1993 when the 
Seventeenth Session of the Hague Conference convened to discuss Mr. Williamson’s 
proposition further through a session of a Special Commission.52 The Special 
Commission of the Hague Conference met in June of 1994, and determined that it would 
be “advantageous to draw up a convention on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement 
                                                 
51  Letter from Edwin D. Williamson, Legal Advisor , U.S. Department of State, to Georges Droz, Secretary 
General, Hague Conference of Private International Law (May 5, 1992) (distributed with Hague 
Conference document L.c. ON No.2 (93), at 3 (Jan. 4, 1993)).  
52  Hague Conference on Private International Law, Proceedings of the Seventeenth Session 10 to 29 May 
1993, Final Act of the Seventeenth Session, First Part, Miscellaneous Matters, at 43 (1995). 
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of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters.”53 It was further recommended that 
this issue be included in the agenda for the eighteenth session of the Hague Conference in 
order to consider it for the future work of the Conference.54 In June of 1995 another very 
similar recommendation was made by the Special Commission on General Affairs and 
Policy of the Conference. It also suggested that the proposals for a judgments convention 
should be adopted as one of the agenda items for the Eighteenth Session of the Hague 
Conference.55 At its Eighteenth Session, which was held from September 30 to October 
19, 1996, the Hague Conference followed these suggestions. As part of the Final Act of 
the Eighteenth Session, the represented nations voted to include in the Agenda of the 
Nineteenth Session the question of “jurisdiction, and recognition, and enforcement of 
foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters.”56  
After all that work it was time for the first formal negotiations and the beginning 
of the preparatory work on a convention on international jurisdiction and the effects of 
foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters at a two week meeting of the Special 
Commission in June 1997.57 In March 1998, the following session of the Special 
Commission was held, but no official document containing draft language was issued 
                                                 
 53 Conclusion of the Special Commission of June 1994 on the Question of the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/legal_affairs/judgments_94.html (last 
visited January 21, 2005). Prel. Doc. No.1 (Jan.4, 1994).  
 54  Id. 
 55  Conclusions of the Special Commission of June 1995 on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference, 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Prel. Doc. No.9, at 31 (Dec. 1995). 
 56  Eighteenth Session Final Act, Hague Conference on Private International Law, October 19, 1996, at 21; 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Proceedings of the Eighteenth Session 30 September 
to 19 October 1996, Final Act of the Eighteenth Session, First Part, Miscellaneous Matters, at 47 
(1999).  
 57 See Catherine Kessedjian, Synthesis of the Work of the Special Commission of June 1997 on 
International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
Preliminary Document No. 8 (November 1997), available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_pd8.pdf (last visited January 21, 2005). 
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during and after this session. However, after a meeting from November 10 to November 
20, 1998, the Drafting Committee presented the first document that contained draft 
language.58 The first draft provisions dealt with various issues such as the scope of the 
convention, the required bases of jurisdiction, provisional and protective matters, 
prohibited grounds of jurisdiction, lis pendens, declining jurisdiction (forum non 
conveniens), rules of recognition, legal aid, and damages.59 The Conference worked on 
this Committee Draft for two weeks in June 1999 and one week in October of 1999. At 
the meeting in October 1999, after five sessions, consisting of eighty-six meetings,60 the 
Special Commission adopted a Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, and released the text to the public.61  
The Nineteenth Session of the Hague Conference was scheduled for the fall of 
2000.62 The plan was to discuss the Preliminary Draft Convention at this Diplomatic 
Conference.63 In the weeks following the fifth and final session of the Special 
Commission in October 1999, however, doubts arose as to whether one year was enough 
time to consider the Special Commission’s draft.64 Apart from that objection, the draft 
was faced with widespread, virulent criticism. In the eyes of the critics, the Preliminary 
                                                 
 58 Special Commission on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Work. Doc. No. 144 E 
(November 20, 1998) [hereinafter Committee Draft]. 
 59  Id. 
 60 See Arthur T. Von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of 
Foreign Judgments Acceptable World-Wide: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, 49 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 191, 191 (2001). As already mentioned two week sessions took place in June 1997, June 
1998, November 1998, and June 1999; the final session in October 1999, lasted ten days. 
 61  Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
Oct. 30, 1999, 15 U.S.T. 2228, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_drafte.pdf (last 
visited January 21, 2005) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft Convention or Preliminary Draft]; for detailed 
information see infra part III. 
 62  See Brand, supra note 35 at 586. 
 63  See supra note 60 at 191. 
 64  Id. 
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Draft Convention failed to address whether, and in what manner intellectual property 
rights and electronic commerce should be covered by the convention.65  
Moreover, another concern was raised by different delegations. The Diplomatic 
Session procedures were criticized for not being suitable for negotiating a convention that 
could be universally accepted.66 The procedural rules for the Diplomatic Sessions set 
forth a majoritarian principle, which did not encourage the reaching of consensus through 
compromise.67 These problems prompted Jeffrey Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser for 
Private International Law at the U.S. State Department and Head of the U.S. Delegation, 
to write to J. Hans A. van Loon, Secretary General of the Hague Conference.68 In his 
letter, dated February 22, 2000, Kovar addressed the concerns of the U.S. Delegation by 
stating that the Preliminary Draft Convention “stands no chance of being accepted in the 
United States.”69 Therefore, he proposed (1) changes in the normal scheduling policy 
regarding the Diplomatic Conferences in order to get “a much more open-ended schedule 
of work” and (2) a change regarding the procedural negotiation rules with the aim of 
achieving “more consensus-based negotiating methods.”70 This letter was a very 
important turning point for the further development of the negotiation process. The 
Hague Conference, aware of the importance of the project, decided to reschedule the 
                                                 
 65  See id. at 192. 
 66  Id.    
 67  Id.  
 68  Letter from Jeffrey D. Kovar, Asst. Legal Advisor for Private International Law, U.S. State Dept., to 
Hans A. Van Loon (Feb. 22, 2000), available at 
http://www.cptech.org/ecom/hague/kovar2loon22022000.pdf (last visited January 21, 2005). 
 69  “[T]he project as currently embodied in the October 1999 preliminary draft convention stands no 
chance of being accepted in the United States. Moreover, our assessment is that the negotiating process 
so far demonstrates no foreseeable possibility for correcting what for us are fatal defects in the 
approach, structure, and details of the text. In our view there has not been adequate progress toward 
creation of a draft convention that would represent a worldwide compromise among extremely different 
legal systems.“   
 70  See supra note 68. 
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Diplomatic Conference and adjusted the procedural rules under which the Preliminary 
Draft Convention would be considered.71 In May 2000, the Special Commission on 
General Affairs and Policy decided to split the Diplomatic Conference into two parts, the 
first being scheduled in June 2001, and the second at a later date to be announced.72 
Furthermore, a consensus, rather than a majority negotiation process was to be applied at 
these and all subsequent meetings.73 In addition it was decided to schedule informal 
sessions between May 2000 and June 2001 to guarantee a reasonable basis and support 
for the work of the Diplomatic Conference.74 
A worldwide effort had begun to work on the Preliminary Draft Convention 
almost immediately after its release.75 The drafters and other experts alike were aiming to 
improve the text.76  
 
3. The Role of the U.S. in the Negotiations  
While the different starting points prior to the negotiations of the Hague project were 
described earlier, this part of the thesis addresses the role that the U.S. played in the 
negotiations and the reasons for the actions that it took.    
As mentioned above, it was the initiative of the United States Department of 
State, represented by Legal Advisor Edwin Williamson, that set the stage for the 
negotiations and the later draft. The U.S. also urged more discussions on the Preliminary 
                                                 
 71  See Brand supra note 35 at 586.  
 72 The relevant part of the May 2000 decision is repeated in The Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, Informational note on the work of the informal meetings held since October 1999 to 
consider and develop drafts on outstanding items, Preliminary Document No. 15 (May 2001) at 1, 
available at ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/jdgm_pd15e.doc. 
 73  Id.  
 74  Id. 
 75  See Marc E. Hankin, Comment: Now that We Know “The Way Forward“, Let Us Stay the Course, 77 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1297 (2002). 
 76  See id. 
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Draft Convention and thus broadened the entire negotiation process. Considering that the 
U.S. is not a party to any convention or other agreement on the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments and against the background that the U.S. delegation 
regarded their “hands to be bound” prior to the negotiation phase, this initiative seems 
surprising. Was this only a simple wish to be a party of the convention in order to achieve 
further unification and fully integrated markets, or can more specific reasons be found? 
To answer this question, it is helpful to look at the U.S. Constitution. The Full 
Faith and Credit Clause in the U.S. Constitution77 ensures that judgments from one state 
are enforceable in every other state. The idea expressed by this rule has long been 
referred to as the basic requirement towards fully integrated markets within the United 
States.78 Although the U.S. is not a party to any of the conventions in the field, it has 
made efforts to enforce foreign country judgments. Over 100 years ago in Hilton v. 
Guyot,
79
 the U.S. Supreme Court decided that foreign country judgments that are 
considered to have a reliable legal system should be enforceable both in federal and in 
state courts under the common law.80 The Uniform Foreign Money Judgments 
Recognition Act81 subsequently strengthened this position. As a result foreign country 
money judgments are often enforced in the United States.82  
This fact alone does not help to answer the original question. It may help to take a 
look at the situation U.S. judgment holders are faced with when trying to enforce their 
                                                 
 77  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 78  Murphy, supra note 23 at 418. 
 79  159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
 80  See id.; see also Murphy, supra note 23 at 419.  
 81 The Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. 263 (1986 & 2000 Supp.). 
Whereas the court in Hilton suggested the requirement of reciprocity in the judgment rendering country, 
this requirement is not longer a part of most state law.  
 82  See Patrick J. Borchers, A Few Little Issues for the Hague Judgments Negotiations, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L 
LAW 157, 157 (1998); see also Juenger, supra note 11 at 113-114.      
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judgments abroad. The fact that even countries that are not a party to any enforcement 
and recognition treaty usually enforce foreign judgments with the exception of those 
rendered in the U.S.83 is alarming for U.S. judgment holders. In the eyes of the foreign 
countries reasons for not doing so are excessive jury awards, the reach of United States 
long – arm jurisdiction, and punitive damages.84 This perspective allows a better 
understanding of the interest of the United States in creating a Hague Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Judgments. From the American perspective the idea is to give U.S. 
litigants the same benefit foreign litigants enjoy, namely the enforcement of domestic 
judgments abroad in foreign jurisdictions. 
 
                                                 
 83  See Murphy, supra note 23 at 419. 
 84  See Juenger, supra note 11 at 114-115; see also Schaack, supra note 38 at 175.   
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CHAPTER 3 
THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT CONVENTION 
 
When the first complete draft was issued in October 1999,85 not everyone expected that 
another period of further negotiations lay before the Hague Conference and the various 
delegations. To understand the dispute and the subsequent process of negotiation, the 
following comments will introduce the first draft, which was used as the fundamental 
basis of drafts to follow. 
 
A. The Structure of the Preliminary Draft Convention 
The drafting of a universal convention on the subject jurisdiction and enforcement of 
judgments was difficult, as was proved by the first disputes that occurred regarding basic 
issues like the scope of a future convention. Different opinions also arose on whether the 
text should be drafted in the style of a double or a mixed convention.86 
 
1. Single and Double Conventions 
A single convention format only regulates indirect jurisdiction and implies a weak sense 
of interdependence.87 Therefore, the single convention idea is best applicable in settings 
that lack strong political and economical commitments.88 Both the earlier conventions 
                                                 
 85  See supra part II.C. 
 86  For general information regarding the design of recognition conventions see Arthur T. Von Mehren, 
Enforcing Judgments Abroad: Reflections On The Design Of Recognition Conventions, 24 BROOK. J. 
INT’L. L. 17 (1998). 
 87  See Von Mehren, supra  note 60 at 197.  
 88  See id. at 198. 
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prepared by the Hague Conference on the subject89 were set forth in a single convention 
style.    
 In the negotiations for the present Hague project the majority of the European 
states favored the approach of a double convention.90 Such an approach would regulate 
both direct and indirect jurisdiction.91 This type of convention creates uniform rules 
regarding the required and prohibited bases of jurisdiction that the national courts in the 
different countries may exercise.92 In other words, it sets forth which claims must and 
must not be granted.93 The required bases of jurisdiction become rules of national law as 
a result of the particular convention and must be available to parties from other 
contracting states. Conversely, the provision containing the prohibited bases of 
jurisdiction prevents the use of only these bases when the defendant is from another 
contracting state. In a pure double convention, all jurisdictional bases not required are 
prohibited.94 The best examples for international double conventions in this context are 
the Brussels95 and the Lugano Conventions, despite differing opinions of some academics 
who do not refer to them as pure double conventions.96   
 
                                                 
 89  Supra notes 13 and 14. 
 90  See Murphy, supra note 23 at 418.  
 91  See Von Mehren, supra note 60 at 197. 
 92  Murphy, supra note 23 at 418; see also id. 
 93  Von Mehren, supra note 60 at 197. 
 94  See Von Mehren, supra note 86 at 19. 
 95 Article 3 paragraph 1 of the Brussels Convention illustrates its character as a double convention: 
“Persons domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued in the courts of another Contracting State only 
by virtue of the rules set out in Section 2 to 6 of this Title [II, Jurisdiction].“ Supra note 21 art. 3 (1). 
 96 Von Mehren, supra note 86 at 20 ff. These academics hold the view that the discussed conventions 
would be purely double in character had they regulated directly not only the assumption of adjudicatory 
authority over defendants domiciled in a Contracting State but also over those not so domiciled. Since 
Article 4 (1) provides that “[i]f the defendant is not domiciled in a Contracting State, the jurisdiction of 
the courts of each Contracting State shall, subject to the provisions of Article 16 [providing for 
exclusive jurisdiction], be determined by the law of that State,“ and not by the convention Brussels and 
Lugano represent a radical form of the single convention structure.      
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2. Mixed Conventions 
A double convention in contrast to a single convention structure is only appropriate 
where the countries involved have relatively common legal traditions and cultures, and 
where a neutral institution97 assures that all member states act according to their 
obligations.98 A mixed convention structure, on the other hand, better matches situations 
where these requirements are lacking. It comes into consideration where there is neither a 
sufficiently compelling sense of interdependence nor a supranational institution that 
serves as a legal guard.99 Aside from the rules regarding the required and prohibited bases 
of jurisdiction, a mixed convention is different from a double convention in that the 
former also allows bases of jurisdiction that fall outside of the convention.100 This group 
of bases of jurisdiction is often referred to as the category of permitted jurisdiction.101 
The mixed convention approach was clearly favored by the United States delegation in 
looking for an appropriate structure for the Preliminary Draft Convention,102 and the 
Preliminary Draft Convention was created according to this structure.  
Articles 3-16 of the Preliminary Draft Convention contain a list of bases in which 
the courts of signatory nations will be required to take personal jurisdiction. Furthermore, 
                                                 
 97 In the case of the Brussels Convention this neutral institution is the European Court of Justice. However, 
when the Brussels Convention was signed in 1968, the European Court of Justice did not have the 
power to review jurisdictional issues. In 1971, a protocol was adopted that gave the European Court of 
Justice the power to be the last instance in terms of interpretation of the convention. 
 98  Von Mehren, supra note 60 at 198. 
 99  Id.  
100  See von Mehren, supra note 86 at 19. 
101 See generally Peter Nygh & Fausto Pocar, Report of the Special Commission on International 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Preliminary Document No.11 
(2000), available at ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/jdgmpd11.doc (last visited January 22, 2004).   
102 See Eric B. Fastiff, The Proposed Hague Convention On The Recognition And Enforcement Of Civil 
And Commercial Judgments: A Solution To Butch Reynold’s Jurisdiction And Enforcement Problems, 
28 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 469, 479 (1995); Brandon B. Danford, The Enforcement Of Foreign Money 
Judgments In The United States And Europe: How Can We Achieve A Comprehensive Treaty?, 23 REV. 
LITIG. 381, 403 (2004). 
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it sets forth in Article 18 of the draft a list of bases which the courts of signatory nations 
will be prohibited from using for the purpose of asserting personal jurisdiction. But 
Article 17 sets forth a list that allows signatory states to assert personal jurisdiction on 
bases that are neither prohibited nor required which makes the difference to a double 
convention structure. Therefore, Contracting States are able to apply rules of jurisdiction 
under their national law as long as these grounds of jurisdiction are not prohibited by the 
convention. According to Article 24 of the Preliminary Draft Convention, however, other 
signatory nations would not be required to recognize or enforce judgments that have been 
rendered based on these national jurisdictional rules. As previously addressed, these 
bases of jurisdiction are often referred to as permitted bases of jurisdiction: contracting 
states may retain these “national” bases of jurisdiction, but their application and any 
question of recognition and enforcement are not governed by the Convention.103      
 
3. The Hague Convention Draft Approach  
In 1992, a Working Group at The Hague Conference had recommended that the 
negotiation concentrate on a draft in a mixed convention style.104 But it took some time 
until the mixed convention structure was adopted and accepted as the final approach. 
While there was some resistance against the mixed convention structure in earlier drafts, 
which is proven by the fact that the convention was originally drafted as a double 
convention,105 the October 1999 Preliminary Draft Convention as well as the later 2001 
Draft were designed in the mixed convention style providing ‘permitted bases of 
                                                 
103 See, e.g., Linda Silberman, Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the Proposed 
Hague Judgments Convention be Stalled?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 319, 324 f. (2002).      
104 Conclusions of the Working Group Meeting on Enforcement of Judgments, Hague Conference on 
Private International Law Doc. L.c. ON No. 2 (93), at 3 (Jan. 4, 1993). 
105  See Silberman, supra note 103 at 324; see also Von Mehren, supra note 60 at 199.   
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jurisdiction.’ The attempt to answer the question of why the recommendation of a mixed 
convention was finally followed, immediately leads to the issue of the large number of 
potential contracting states. The double convention structure, which only provides two 
categories of bases of jurisdiction is not the ideal choice in conventions seeking to be 
universally acceptable. Considering the many different legal systems the convention had 
to integrate into the negotiating process, it seems nearly impossible to reach an agreement 
about what should be assigned to the group of the required bases of jurisdiction and what 
to the group of prohibited jurisdiction. As a result, the double convention structure would 
be too inflexible for the large number of different countries that are participated in the 
negotiation process. The mixed convention structure seems to be the better choice in the 
effort to reach agreement on the proposed Hague Convention. It provides some kind of a 
“loophole” by creating a more flexible system not only in terms of the later outcome of 
the convention language, but also in terms of the flexibility in the negotiation process as a 
whole.   
 
B. The Scope of the Preliminary Draft Convention 
Chapter I of the Preliminary Draft Convention regulates the scope of the convention. 
Whereas Article 1106 contains the rules for the substantive scope, Article 2 regulates the 
territorial scope.  
 The language in Article 1 (1) of the Preliminary Draft Convention limits its scope 
to “civil and commercial matters.”107 This very general provision is put into perspective 
                                                 
106 All articles without specification of source that are mentioned under III.B.-E. refer to the Preliminary 
Draft Convention unless indicated otherwise. 
107  See Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, art. 1 (1). 
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by the exclusion of “revenue, customs, [and] administrative matters.”108 Article 1 (2) 
explains in detail what is meant by this.109 Like the Brussels and Lugano Convention, 
Article 2 of the Preliminary Draft Convention not only provides for the enforcement of 
foreign judgments, but it also sets forth rules for the exercise of personal jurisdiction by 
the courts of one signatory country over habitual residents of another.110 However, the 
jurisdictional rules in Chapter II of the Preliminary Draft Convention are not applicable if 
both parties are habitually resident in the same state.111       
 
C. Jurisdiction  
1. The General Rule of Jurisdiction  
Two different approaches are used in other conventions when determining general 
jurisdiction. On one hand, the defendant’s domicile determines were a suit can be 
brought. This approach is, for example, used in the Brussels and Lugano Convention.112 
The problem with this approach is the fact that ‘domicile’ is subject to various legal 
definitions in the different countries. Due to the high number of expected contracting 
countries for a future Hague Convention, a more factual approach is preferred. Existing 
Hague Conference conventions often faced the same problem of defining certain terms 
                                                 
108  Id. 
109  According to Article 1 (1) of the Preliminary Draft Convention the excluded matters are the following: 
a) the status and legal capacity of natural persons; b) maintenance obligations; c) matrimonial property 
regimes and other rights and obligations arising out of marriage or similar relationships; d) wills and 
succession; e) insolvency, composition or analogous proceedings; f) social security; g) arbitration and 
proceedings related thereto; h) admiralty or maritime matters. Id. art. 1 (1).   
110  See Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, art. 2. Article 2 reads in part: “The provisions of 
Chapter II shall apply in the courts of a Contracting State unless all the parties are habitually resident in 
that State [...].“ 
111  Id. 
112 Brussels Convention, supra note 21, art. 2; Lugano Convention, supra note 30, art. 2.  
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and thus focus on the defendant’s habitual residence.113 Since the habitual residence 
approach is much more factually oriented, it is subject to more uniform interpretation and 
would be more useful for the Hague Conference project. According to this Hague 
Conference tradition Article 3 (1) adopted the habitual resident approach.114 A similar 
approach is applicable to legal persons. Article 3 (2) states that the rule for general 
jurisdiction over legal persons is that they are considered to be habitually resident in the 
state of statutory seat, the state of incorporation, the state of central management, or the 
state of the corporation’s principle place of business.115  
 
2. Choice of Court Clauses 
The normal presumption in the United States regarding choice of court clauses is that 
such clauses are not exclusive unless the parties specifically provide for exclusivity.116 In 
contrast, E.U. Council Regulation No. 44/2001 provides that a court chosen by the parties 
“shall have jurisdiction” and that this jurisdiction “shall be exclusive unless the parties 
have agreed otherwise.”117 By stating that a court chosen by the parties “shall have 
jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless the parties have agreed 
                                                 
113 See Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations, supra note 14, art. 2 (1) and art. 
3; see also Brand, supra note 35 at 590. 
114 See Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, art. 3. Article 3 reads: „[...] a natural person may be 
sued for any claim in the courts [of the Contracting State] [of the place] where the person is habitually 
resident [...].” 
115 See id., art. 3 (2).  
116 See Brand, supra note 35 at 591. 
117 Council Regulation No. 44/2001, supra note 25, art. 23 (1). Article 23 (1) reads as follows: ”If the 
parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Member State, have agreed that a court or the courts of a 
Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in 
connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall have jurisdiction. Such 
jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless the parties have agreed otherwise. [...]”.  
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otherwise,” Article 4 of the Preliminary Draft Convention118 uses nearly the same exact 
wording as that contained in the Council Regulation.   
Besides the issue of the choice of law clauses, Article 4 also provides language 
addressing validity in terms of form. Aside from the fact that a choice of law agreement 
can be in writing,119 it may also be made “by any other means of communication which 
renders information accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference,” or “in 
accordance with a usage which is regularly observed by the parties,” or also  “in 
accordance with a usage of which the parties were or ought to have been aware and 
which is regularly observed by parties to contracts of the same nature in the particular 
trade or commerce concerned.”120    
 
3. Special Appearances  
In Article 5 it becomes clear that there is an opportunity in the Preliminary Draft to enter 
a special appearance contesting jurisdiction without submitting to jurisdiction on the 
merits. It provides that a defendant who appears in court to defend on the merits has to 
keep in mind that there is an assumption that he will be treated as if he has consented to 
jurisdiction, unless objection is raised prior to the first defense on the merits.121  
 
4. Specific Bases of Jurisdiction   
Apart from the rule of jurisdiction in Article 3, which provides for general jurisdiction 
over a defendant for any claims, the Preliminary Draft Convention text contains a number 
                                                 
118 Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, art. 4. 
119 Id. art. 4 (2)(a). 
120 Id. art. 4 (2) (b) – (d). 
121 Id. art. 5. 
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of other provisions that make it possible to provide further fora for the plaintiff in a court 
that is located in a state that is not the habitual residence of the defendant. These specific 
provisions include rules in contract122 and tort123 cases. Furthermore, there are specific 
provisions for consumers and employees.124 The Preliminary Draft Convention also sets 
forth rules for jurisdiction over claims related to the activity of the defendant through a 
branch, agency or establishment in the Contracting State.125 Exclusive jurisdiction is 
given to cases involving trusts.126 Article 12 provides more rules creating exclusive 
jurisdiction, and it contains a provision that is of special interest in this context. Cases 
involving the registration of intellectual property rights get special treatment since they 
are expressly mentioned in the provision.127 In addition to these specific bases of 
jurisdiction, additional jurisdictional provisions dealing with jurisdiction for personal 
relief and with multiple-party actions can be found in Articles 13-16. 
 
5. Permitted and Prohibited Bases of Jurisdiction  
As discussed above, the Preliminary Draft Convention is written in a mixed convention 
style since it is divided into required, prohibited and permitted bases of jurisdiction.128 
The required bases of jurisdiction are contained in Articles 3-16 of the draft and were 
                                                 
122 Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, art. 6. 
123 Id. art. 10. 
124 Id. art. 7 and 8 
125 Id. art. 9. 
126 Id. art. 11. 
127 Id. art. 12 (4). This article reads as follows: “In proceedings which have as their object the registration, 
validity, [or] nullity [, or revocation or infringement,] of patents, trade marks, designs or other similar 
rights required to be deposited or registered, the courts of the Contracting State in which the deposit or 
registration has been applied for, has taken place or, under the terms of an international convention, is 
deemed to have taken place, have exclusive jurisdiction. This shall not apply to copyright or any 
neighboring rights, even though registration or deposit of such rights is possible.”  
128 While the list of required bases of jurisdiction is often described as “white“ list, the list of the prohibited 
and permitted bases of jurisdiction are conferred to as “black“ and “grey“ list. 
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previously described in detail. The language of Article 17 makes the difference in 
comparison to a double convention structure. It sets forth that states may exercise 
jurisdiction “under national law” in the absence of exclusive jurisdiction, a choice of 
forum clause under Article 4, or other bases of preferred jurisdiction when the certain 
bases of jurisdiction are neither required in earlier articles nor prohibited in Article 18.129 
In Article 18, another list of different bases of jurisdiction can be found. The use of these 
bases of jurisdiction is prohibited when the defendant is from another contracting state. In 
Article 18 (1), the Preliminary Draft Convention describes the list of the prohibited bases 
of jurisdiction as follows: ”Where the defendant is habitually resident in a Contracting 
State, the application of a rule of jurisdiction provided for under the national law of a 
Contracting State is prohibited if there is no substantial connection between the State and 
the dispute.”130 In paragraph 2 of Article 18, the draft provides a list of examples in 
which such a substantial connection between the particular state and the dispute cannot 
be assumed: the domicile, habitual or temporary residence, or presence of the plaintiff in 
the specific state,131 or the nationality of the plaintiff or of the defendant.132  
With Article 18 (2)(e) and (2)(f), two other examples should receive special 
consideration since these provisions are of particular interest for the United States. Most 
state long – arm statutes and also the Due Process clause of the Fifth and the Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States commonly allow general “doing 
                                                 
129 Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, art. 17. This article reads as follows: “Subject to Articles 
4, 5, 7, 8, 12 and 13, the Convention does not prevent the application by Contracting States of rules of 
jurisdiction under national law, provided that this is not prohibited under Article 18.”    
130 Id. art. 18 (1). 
131 Id. art. 18 (2)(d).  
132 Id. art. 18 (2)(b), (c).  
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business” jurisdiction.133 Article 18 (2)(e) was created to forbid exactly this general 
“doing business” jurisdiction by stating that jurisdiction based on “the carrying on of 
commercial or other activities by the defendant in [the] state” shall be prohibited.134 An 
exception is made for situations “where the dispute is directly related to those 
activities.”135 Article 18 (2)(f),136 on the other hand, was set forth to prohibit another 
jurisdictional institution that is also typical of the United States legal system. It prohibits 
the United States’ “tag” jurisdiction. This kind of jurisdiction is purely based on the 
service of process on the defendant while temporarily present in the state.137 Article 18 
(2) lists further examples that will not be described in detail here.138    
Article 18 (3) deals with the exceptions to the general rules contained in the first 
two paragraphs and is indicated in bracketed language. It is intended that if the case is 
brought for human rights violations under international law, any of the normally 
prohibited bases of jurisdiction are continued to be allowed as permitted bases of 
jurisdiction.139 The pressure of concerned groups and individuals that formed the Human 
Rights Coalition with the intention to participate in the negotiations led to the inclusion of 
this provision in Article 18.140 The reason for including this provision was the fear of the 
Human Rights Coalition that a new convention without an exception would frustrate 
                                                 
133 See Brand, supra note 35 at 592.   
134 Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, art. 18 (2)(e). 
135 Id.  
136 Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, art. 18 (2)(f).  
137 See Brand, supra note 35 at 592.  
138 Further examples listed in Article 18 (2) are the following: a) the presence or the seizure in the particular 
state of property belonging to the defendant (with an exception if the dispute is directly related to the 
property in discussion; h) proceeding in the state in question for declaration of enforceability or 
registration or for the enforcement of a judgment (with an exception where the dispute is directly related 
to the listed proceedings); i) the temporary residence or presence of the defendant in the particular state; 
j) the pure signing in the specific state of the contract from which the dispute arises. 
139 See Murphy, supra note 23 at 420, 421. For a general discussion of this human rights exception, see 
Schaack, supra note 38 at 141.     
140 See Schaack, id. at 184 ff.  
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developing methods for bringing suits against former state officials who have engaged in 
wrongful conduct.141 Special consideration in this context was given to cases that were, 
or are brought under the United States “tag” jurisdiction.142     
    
6. Lis Pendens and Forum Non Conveniens 
Article 21 and 22 of the Preliminary Draft Convention determine what happens when 
more than one jurisdiction is available in cases connected to more than one legal system 
and more than one court was seized of the case. To understand these provisions, their 
background in the different legal systems involved in the negotiation process shall be 
described first. 
Having its first roots in the year 1801 in Willendson v. Forsoket,143 the concept of 
forum non conveniens in the United States is described as a doctrine that gives the court 
substantial discretion when more than one forum is available for the trail of an action.144 
However, this doctrine presupposes at least one alternative forum in which the suit can be 
prosecuted.145 It does not, however, provide a catalogue of circumstances that would lead 
to the assumption that the court either has or does not have jurisdiction.146 Rather, the 
doctrine trusts in the discretion of the court147 as mentioned above. Thus, this concept 
                                                 
141 See Brand, supra note 35 at 592 f.; see also Schaack, id. at 142 f. 
142 See Brand, id. 
143 Willendson v. Forsoket, 29 F. Cas. 1283, 1284 (D. Pa. 1801) (No. 17,682).  
144 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 ff. (1947). 
145 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 87-88 (2d ed. 1993). 
146 See Ronald A. Brand, Comparative Forum Non Conveniens and the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Judgments, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 467, 476 (2002). 
147 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, supra note 144 at 508. 
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places the focus on the appropriateness of one forum in comparison to others that would 
be available as well.148   
The forum non conveniens approach, which is typical in common law countries, 
has no direct equivalent in the civil law system. For example, there is no express 
provision of German law that would allow for a forum non convenience doctrine.149 
However, there is a counterpart that comes into play in civil law countries in situations 
where the forum non conveniens doctrine applies in the common law systems. Although 
the Lugano150 and Brussels Convention151 and the Brussels Regulation152 replacing the 
latter do not contain any direct provision for the doctrine of forum non conveniens,153 the 
Regulation does apply a combination of contractual choice of court clauses154 and a strict 
rule of lis pendens155 in order to establish jurisdiction. Although this creates certainty, 
predictability, and neutrality it has to be pointed out that the European approach creates 
what is usually refer to as a “race to the courthouse.”156  
Considering the differences between the common law forum non conveniens and 
the civil law lis pendens approach, it seems surprising that this matter was precisely one 
                                                 
148 See Brand, supra note 146 at 468. 
149 For a general comparative overview regarding this matter see Alexander Reus, Judicial Discretion: A 
Comparative View of the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and Germany, 16 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 455 (1994).   
150 Supra note 30. 
151 Supra note 21. 
152 Supra note 25. 
153 The fact that there is not such a provision can be interpreted as a general prohibition of the application of 
the forum non convenience principle within the European Union, see Brand, supra note 146 at 489. 
154 Brussels Regulation, supra note 25, art. 23.  
155 Brussels Regulation, supra note 25, art. 27. This Article reads as follows: “1. Where proceeding 
involving the same cause of action and between the same parties are brought in the courts of different 
Member States, any court other than the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings 
until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established.  2. Where the jurisdiction of the 
court first seised is established, any court other than the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction in 
favour of that court.“  
156 See, e.g., Anna Gardella & Radicati di Brozolo, Civil Law, Common Law And Market Integration: The 
EC Approach To Conflicts Of Jurisdiction, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 611 (2003). 
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of the areas of early agreement and compromise in the negotiations of the Hague 
Convention. The Preliminary Draft Convention sets forth a combination of the lis 
pendens rule in Article 21 and a modified forum non conveniens approach in Article 
22157 which is insofar unusual as the latter was always considered to be only available in 
common law systems.158 Article 21, which adopts the Brussels Convention-style lis 
pendens approach, provides that “the court second seized shall suspend the proceedings if 
the court first seized has jurisdiction”159 and that this court “shall decline jurisdiction as 
soon as it is presented with a judgment rendered by the court first seized.”160 However, 
the court second seized does not have to suspend the proceedings if it has exclusive 
jurisdiction either under Article 4 (choice of court) or under Article 12 (verification of 
jurisdiction).161 Thus, as indicated above, the approach in the Brussels Regulation is the 
first element of the compromise. By stating that the lis pendens rule shall not apply if the 
court first seized “determines that the court second seized is clearly more appropriate to 
resolve the dispute” Article 21, paragraph 7, ties the language in Article 21 to Article 22 
of the Preliminary Convention text according to which such a determination is 
possible.162  
Article 22 represents the second part of the compromise, since it incorporates a 
modification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens as applied in the common law 
system.163 The forum non conveniens rule of the Preliminary Draft Convention provides 
                                                 
157 Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, art. 21 and 22. 
158 See Brand, supra note 35 at 593. 
159 Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, art. 21 (1). 
160 Id. art. 21 (2). 
161  Id. art. 21 (1). 
162  Id. art. 21 (7).  
163 Preliminary Draft Convention, art. 22 (1) provides that the court first seized, if it should not have 
exclusive jurisdiction under the provisions of the convention, may “[i]n exceptional circumstances [...] 
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four requirements. Firstly, the court must not have exclusive jurisdiction. Secondly, 
“exceptional circumstances” must be involved in the case and the court that was seized 
must be a forum that is considered to be “clearly inappropriate.” The last of the four 
requirements is that “a clearly more appropriate” forum must be provided by another 
state also having jurisdiction. To give the court an idea of what can be an appropriate 
forum, Article 22 (2) sets forth four factors that are not exclusive, though.164 
  
D. Recognition and Enforcement  
Chapter III of the Preliminary Draft Convention (Articles 23 to 36) deals with the matter 
of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Within this chapter, the distinction 
between required, prohibited, and permitted bases of jurisdiction must be taken into 
account again. The principles regarding the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
completes the idea of a mixed convention style. The general concept of this chapter is 
that the judgments based on required bases of jurisdiction “shall be recognized or 
enforced.”165 However, not recognized or enforced are those judgments that are based on 
prohibited bases of jurisdiction under Article 18.166 The same is true for judgments that 
are based on grounds of jurisdiction conflicting with either a choice of court clause or 
exclusive bases of jurisdiction, as provided by the Preliminary Draft Convention.167 As 
far as permitted bases of jurisdiction are concerned, the convention rules on recognition 
                                                                                                                                                 
on application by a party, suspend its proceedings if in that case it is clearly inappropriate  for that court 
to exercise jurisdiction and if a court of another state has jurisdiction and is clearly more appropriate to 
resolve the dispute.“ Id. art. 22 (1).   
164 These factors provided by Art. 22 (2) are: “a) any inconvenience to the parties in view of their habitual 
residence; b) the nature and location of the evidence, including documents and witnesses, and the 
procedures for obtaining such evidence; c) applicable limitation or prescription periods; d) the 
possibility of obtaining recognition and enforcement of any decision on the merits.“     
165 Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, art. 25 (1). 
166 Id. art. 26. 
167 Id. 
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and enforcement of judgments shall not apply.168 Instead, these judgments are to be 
treated under national law.169   
Article 33 makes clear that the recognition may include a limitation on damages 
in the recognizing court. This limitation regards the concerns that were raised among 
others by the European members of the Hague Conference about punitive damage awards 
and compensatory awards rendered in U.S. courts that are considered “excessive” in the 
eyes of European judicial systems, for example.170 According to Article 33, courts do not 
have to recognize and enforce punitive and multiple damage awards unless ”similar or 
comparable damages could have been awarded” in their own state.171 As far as 
“excessive” compensatory damage awards are concerned Article 33 (2) states that if 
“grossly excessive damages” are awarded in a judgment the recognition may be limited 
to less than the full amount.172           
 
E. Other General Provisions  
It is not a secret that the European Union with its many institutions is a good place if one 
is an interpreter looking for employment. The interpretation of the legal language of the 
instruments issued by the European Union is one of the major problems its member states 
have to face. Therefore, it is not very difficult to imagine that a future Hague Convention 
would have to face similar if not bigger problems, since there are considerably more 
members in the Hague Conference than there are in the European Union. Another 
problem would be the cultural, legal, and social diversity among the several member 
                                                 
168 Id. art. 24. 
169 Id.; see also Brand, supra note 35 at 593. 
170 See Brand, supra note 35 at 593.  
171 Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, art. 33 (1). 
172 Id. art. 33 (2)(a). 
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states that could obstruct the interpretation process and bear the risk of conflicting 
interpretations. Article 38 of the Preliminary Convention text tries to resolve this problem 
by advising the courts to interpret the convention with “regard [...] to [...] its international 
character and the need to promote uniformity in its application.” Articles 39 and 40173 try 
to constitute a system which has three major goals. Firstly, significant convention 
decisions from all contracting states would be collected. Besides this, a periodic review 
of the operation of the convention by a Special Commission was planned. If there were to 
be problems in a dispute that is attributed to the interpretation of the convention, a 
committee of experts was intended to assist parties and courts that have problems by 
providing those with recommendations.174  
Aside from the heading in Article 41, “Federal Clause,” no further substantial 
language indicates that the drafters of the Preliminary Draft Convention intended to 
include provisions on how the convention would operate within a federal system.175 
Furthermore, up to this point in the negotiations there was also no complete provision on 
the relationship of the Hague Convention to other treaties.176    
 
 
                                                 
173 It is important to point out that these provisions were set forth in brackets.  
174 Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, art. 40 (1). 
175 Brand, supra note 35 at 594.   
176 Id.  
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CHAPTER 4 
DEVELOPMENTS IN AND AFTER THE JUNE 2001 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE 
 
Between February 2000 and June 2001, informal sessions for the Hague project 
were held in Washington, Basle, Geneva, Ottawa, and Edinburgh in order to improve the 
Preliminary Draft Convention.177 The June 2001 Diplomatic Conference was another 
milestone in the negotiation process because the Preliminary Draft was further developed. 
The result of the first part of the Diplomatic Conference in June 2001 was a text full of 
alternatives, variations, and bracketed language.178 These circumstances indicated that 
there was no agreement on many specific matters and that much work was left to be 
done. 
 
A. Changes in the Convention Text  
It is important to point out which changes in comparison with the Preliminary Draft 
Convention were made in detail in the Interim Text. While no changes were made to the 
convention structure,179 the scope of the convention was subject to a few changes. 
Antitrust claims and nuclear liability matters were added to Article 1 Interim Text.180 The 
fact that these two points were added in brackets indicates that a final agreement on this 
                                                 
177 See Brand, supra note 35 at 598.  
178 This document can be found in the revised text of the Preliminary Draft Convention, found in the 
Interim Text of the Diplomatic Conference: Hague Conference on Private International Law, 
Commission II, Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nineteenth 
Session; Summary of the Outcome of the Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the 
Diplomatic Conference 6 – 20 June 2001 [hereinafter Interim Text], available at 
ftp://hcch.net/doc/jdgm2001draft_e.doc (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).  
179 See Brand, supra note 35 at 598. 
180 Interim Text, supra note 178, art. 1. All articles without specification of source that are mentioned under 
IV.A. refer to the Interim Text unless indicated otherwise. 
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issue has not yet been made. This is also true for Alternative B of Article 1, which 
suggests the exclusion of rights in immovable property and claims related to the validity, 
nullity, or dissolution of a legal person.181 The entire Interim Text is full of bracketed 
language and footnotes trying to bring light into the darkness of the jungle of alternatives.  
 Regarding the issue of jurisdiction in Article 3, there was an agreement that the 
defendant’s forum should serve as the forum of general jurisdiction.182 But another 
change was made: The “habitual residence” requirement was set in brackets left behind 
only “residence.” This change was due to the problem that natural persons can have 
multiple residences.183 In case of a multiple residence situation the focus was to be on the 
principle of residence.184 No major changes were undertaken in the rule for choice of 
forum clauses, but bracketed language again indicates the need for further discussions on 
this issue.185 
As far as special appearance under the convention regulated in Article 5 is 
concerned the text has both changed and remained unchanged. While the presumption 
that a defendant appearing on the merits has consented to jurisdiction under the 
convention had been deleted, the general concept of special appearance was retained.186 
The defendant, furthermore, had the right to contest jurisdiction until the time of the first 
actual defense on the merits.187  
                                                 
181 Id., art. 1, alternative B note 11. 
182 Id., art. 3 note 16. 
183 See  Brand, supra note 35 at 599.   
184 Id. 
185 Interim Text, supra note 178, art. 4. 
186 Compare Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, art. 5, with Interim Text, id., art. 5. The change 
is also indicated by the change in the name of the article from “Appearance by the defendant“ to 
“Defendant’s right to contest jurisdiction.“ 
187 See Interim Text, supra note 178, art. 5. 
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While the general jurisdiction rule was left nearly unchanged, the discussions 
about the specific bases of jurisdiction were more controversial. In the informal meetings 
and the Diplomatic Conference, much time was spent on Articles 6 and 10, which assess 
contract and tort respectively.188 Hardly discussed was Article 12 which deals with the 
rules of exclusive jurisdiction.189 The majority of discussions were focused on the 
provisions that have an impact on electronic commerce and intellectual property rights. 
The gap between the negotiating parties in these matters was so significant that the two 
issues were given their own chapters.190 The changes on these parts of the convention 
will be discussed later.  
The additional bases of jurisdiction were subject to changes as well. Article 14 of 
the Preliminary Draft Convention would have authorized jurisdiction over multiple 
defendants in cases where jurisdiction existed over only one of them.191 This Article was 
deleted in the Interim Text.192 The same happened to Article 16 of the Preliminary Draft 
Convention,193 which contained a similar rule for third party claims.194  
Similar controversial discussions were held on the matter of the permitted and 
prohibited bases of jurisdiction. The especially difficult question remained as to what to 
include in the list of the prohibited bases of jurisdiction. The problem was to find a 
healthy balance between the matters on this list and the inclusion of related matters on the 
list that represents the required bases of jurisdiction.195 This explains why Article 18 of 
                                                 
188 See Brand, supra note 35 at 599. 
189 Id. 
190 See infra part VI.A. and VI.B. 
191 See Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, art. 14.  
192 Interim Text, supra note 178, commend to art. 14. 
193 Id., commend to art. 16. 
194 See Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, art. 16.  
195 See Brand, supra note 35 at 600. 
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the Interim Text remained largely in brackets196 indicating that further discussion was 
necessary.  
As addressed earlier, the wording in Articles 21 and 22 was an area of early 
compromise although no one would have expected that, considering the differences 
between the lis pendence and the forum non conveniens approach.197 Thus, these 
provisions remained relatively unchanged even after the 2001 Diplomatic Conference.198 
The provisions dealing with the problems on recognition and enforcement of judgments 
remained unchanged for the most part.199 That indicated consensus between the 
negotiating parties in this context as well.    
 
B. Developments and Different Perspectives 
1. Beginning Anew 
After the June 2001 Diplomatic Conference the negotiations had come to a standstill 
since it had ended in disagreement, as demonstrated by the bracketed Interim Text. After 
reaching this impasse, the negotiations were suspended until a three day meeting from 
April 22 to 24 of the Hague Conference’s Commission I on General Affairs and Policy of 
the Nineteenth Diplomatic Session of the Hague Conference in The Hague. Officials 
from different delegations met to discuss whether there was a chance for the Hague 
                                                 
196 Interim Text, supra note 178, art. 18. 
197 See supra part III.C.6. 
198 Compare Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, art. 21, 22, with Interim Text, supra note 178, 
art. 21, 22. 
199 Compare Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, Chapter III, with Interim Text, supra note 178, 
Chapter III. 
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Convention project to be continued, and if so, how it would continue.200 Already before 
the meeting in April problems with the further negotiations became apparent: The United 
States was in favor of moving forward in negotiating the provisions that are subject to 
little controversy. This implied the dropping of the controversial issues and the wish to 
develop a narrower treaty.201 Other states like Australia, Japan, Canada, and also the 
European Union proposed a return to the Preliminary Draft Convention and therefore 
favored comprehensive treaty negotiations.202 At the meeting itself it turned out 
immediately that there was a common will to continue with the negotiations. It was 
agreed to set up a new drafting committee with the intention to begin the drafting process 
anew, avoiding and dropping the most controversial matters and concentrating on the 
relatively non-controversial issues.203 This outcome and especially the creation of an 
informal working group on the judgments project, however, was not expected by 
everyone after the Australian and the Japanese delegation released a letter that proposed 
the basis for the negotiations to be the 1999 Preliminary Draft Convention.204 The 
problem with this suggestion was that the alternative to go back to the Preliminary Draft 
level had long ago been deemed as unworkable by U.S. official and business interests.205   
                                                 
200 William New, E – Commerce: U.S. May Face Opposition On Narrow Jurisdiction Treaty, April 17, 
2002, available at http://www.cptech.org/ecom/jurisdiction/techapril02.html (last visited January 21, 
2005). 
201 State Department lawyer Jeffrey Kovar, the head of the United States delegation in the negotiations 
stated: “We would like the other member states of the Hague Conference to focus on those elements of 
the comprehensive draft that are achievable now and forgo those other elements until the time is right to 
address them.” See id.       
202 New, supra note 200. 
203 Anandashankar Mazumdar, Hague Convention Negotiations Continue; Delegations Appear Ready to 
Begin Anew, in: BNA, May 2, 2002, available at 
http://www.cptech.org/ecom/jurisdiction/bnamay2.html (last visited January 21, 2005).   
204 See id. 
205 See id. 
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However, a new working group was created to negotiate a new draft. This 
working group, containing less than 20 members, was smaller than past negotiating 
groups.206 With the small size of the group it was intended to make the agreement process 
more effective, to let aside political influences, and to concentrate technical skills.207 The 
working group planned to meet two or three times in 2002 and aimed to come up with a 
new draft for the Convention in early 2003.208 The official conclusion of the treaty was 
projected for a final Diplomatic Conference dealing with the judgment and enforcement 
topic before the end of 2003,209 even though there were many doubts that the negotiation 
process would move quickly enough to hold a Diplomatic Conference at the scheduled 
time.210 However, the head of the coordinating body for the negotiations was convinced 
that a limited treaty could emerge in late 2003.211 The standpoint of the Hague 
Conference after the April 2002 meeting is well demonstrated by a statement of Hans 
Vaan Loon, then secretary general of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 
who stated that too much pressure to expand the scope of the Hague Convention during 
the negotiations would make the project ultimately fail.212  
                                                 
206 See id. 
207 See id. 
208 Andrea Schultz, Reflection Paper to Assist in the Preparation of a Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Preliminary 
Document No. 19 of August 2002, page 5, available at ftp://hcch.net/doc/jdgm2001draft_e.doc (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Preliminary Document No. 19].  
209 Id.; see also Tery Rucker & William New, E – Commerce: Hague Treaty Talks On Long Track Again, 
in: Techdaily Story, May 5, 2002, available at 
http://www.cptech.org/ecom/jurisdiction/techmay602.html (last visited January 21, 2005).  
210 See Mazumdar, supra note 203.  
211 William New, E – Commerce: Hague Leader Foresees Limited Treaty for Online Disputes, in: National 
Journal’s Technology Daily, May 08, 2002, available at http://www.cptech.org/ecom/jurisdiction/ 
      techmay802.html (last visited January 21, 2005). 
212 Id.   
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It was decided to take “the core area and possible additions” as a basis for further 
negotiations.213 Keeping this in mind two stages of negotiations were designed. The goal 
of the first stage, as mentioned above, was to concentrate on the core of the convention 
and, therefore, to negotiate on more or less non-controversial subjects like choice of 
court, jurisdiction in the domicile of the defendant, jurisdiction with respect to branches 
of companies, appearance, physical torts, trusts, and counterclaims.214 The second stage 
was designed to discuss whether and how more controversial matters could be included 
after consensus was reached on the basic provisions discussed in the first stage. 
Therefore, it was intended to broaden the convention at a later point in time.215 The most 
important issues in this context involve jurisdiction to hear e-commerce and other internet 
related disputes as well as disputes involving intellectual property rights.216 Nonetheless 
topics like jurisdiction based on activity, consumer and employment contracts, the 
relationship of the proposed Hague Convention to regional regulations on jurisdiction, 
and bilateralisation were on the list of topics that seemed to bar the negotiation 
process.217 
 
2. First Meeting on the Judgment Project 
The first meeting of the Informal Working Group on the Judgments Project, which was 
held in The Hague from October 22 to 25, 2002, was prepared by a paper that 
                                                 
213 Preliminary Document No. 19, supra note 208 at 5.  
214 Tanguy van Overstraeten & Sylvie Rousseau, Drafters Revive Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments, in: World Ebusiness Law Report, July 18, 2002, available at 
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/hague-jur-commercial-law/2002-July/000657.html (last visited 
January 21, 2005).   
215 Id. 
216 Id.; see also Mazumdar, supra note 203.   
217 See Anandashankar Mazumdar, New Hague Group Presented With Litany of Jurisdictional Issues for 
Narrower Treaty, September 6, 2002, available at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/hague-jur-
commercial-law/2002-September/000679.html (last visited January 21, 2005). 
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summarized and outlined the major issues that had to be discussed leading to a treaty 
with a limited scope.218 This paper was issued by First Secretary Andrea Schulz, a 
member of the Hague Conference staff heading up the working group.219 The main 
concern of this paper was to address the question of whether it would be reasonable to 
limit a later Hague Convention to choice of court clauses in business-to-business cases.220 
This was a concern because the choice of court agreements in business-to-business cases 
were identified as one of the “core areas” besides the provisions on recognition and 
enforcement in both the Preliminary Draft Convention and the Interim Text.221 
Furthermore, it has to be pointed out that contracts between businesses typically specify 
which country’s court system will be used if a dispute arises over the transaction, hence 
such clauses merit special consideration.    
During the meeting, the members of the new working group focused almost 
entirely on exclusive choice of court clauses in business-to-business cases. The 
discussion in this context concentrated on possible convention requirements on formal 
and substantive validity of such choice of court clauses, the possible scope of a rule on 
choice of court clauses, the issues in the relationship with other conventions, 
bilateralisation, and the applicability or non-applicability of national and or convention 
rules on lis pendens and forum non conveniens. It also focused on the problem of 
personal versus subject matter jurisdiction and the question of interim relief.222   
                                                 
218 Preliminary Document No. 19, supra note 208. 
219 Andrea Schultz was formerly a member of the German delegation to the Hague Conference and is now 
on the Hague Conference’s staff.   
220 See Preliminary Document No. 19, supra note 208 at 7 ff. 
221 Id. at 6. 
222 Id. at 4. 
 47 
Another matter discussed was a possible exclusion of patents and trademarks, 
both registered and unregistered, which would leave only copyrights covered by the 
scope of the treaty.223 The outcome of the discussion was the decision to seek feedback in 
the different countries about this plan.224 The next meeting was planned to take place in 
early January 2003, and two others were to follow in March and May 2003. 
 
3. Second Meeting on the Judgment Project  
The Informal Working Group on the Judgments Project gathered a second time in The 
Hague from January 6 to 9, 2003.225 At this meeting, the discussion from the first meeting 
on the Judgment Project were continued, and questions that had remained open were 
revisited. The meeting mainly focused on the exclusive choice of court clauses, 
specifically concentrating on the definition of “exclusive” to determine where to draw the 
line between exclusive and non-exclusive choice of court clauses.226 Other issues 
discussed during the meeting were linked to the limitation of the scope of the treaty. The 
group primarily discussed whether a case involving a choice of court clause should be 
required to have some international element in order to be covered by the scope of the 
convention.227 Other topics discussed included whether some kind of objective link with 
the chosen forum was necessary,228 and whether there should be a general escape clause 
                                                 
223 Id. at 12.  
224 Id. 
225 For the outcome of this meeting see Andrea Schultz, Report on the Second Meeting of the Informal 
Working Group on the Judgments Project – January 6-9, 2003, Preliminary Document No. 21 available 
at ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/jdgm_pd21e.pdf [hereinafter Preliminary Document No. 21]. 
226 Id. at 5 ff. 
227 Id. at 7 f. 
228 Id. at 8 f. 
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including a public policy provision.229 There were also further discussions regarding 
intellectual property issues.230 Moreover, the group addressed whether it would still be 
possible to add further bases of jurisdiction to the reduced convention scope and which 
bases should be considered.231 In this context consent / waiver / submission, counter-
claims, and defendant’s forum were taken into consideration.232  
 
a. A New Draft 
The discussions were interesting generally. The most interesting issue at the second 
meeting, however, was due to the consequence of a requirement places on the group in 
this meeting by the Commission on General Affairs in April 2002. The meeting was 
obliged to come up with a first draft of a possible convention based on the result of the 
discussions that had thus far taken place.  
The informal working group fulfilled this obligation by issuing first draft 
language. The member states of the Hague Conference as well as other interested parties 
were provided not only with some new draft language but with a completely new draft. 
More than 10 years after the birth of the project of the Hague Conference a new draft 
appeared that was to decide whether the undertaking would have a promising future or 
whether it would be forgotten after little more than a decade. The new draft was issued in 
the annex of the official report of the second meeting of the informal working group.233 
The word draft can be understood literally since the issued language only included what 
the parties had agreed upon up to that point. 
                                                 
229 Id. at 9 ff.  
230 Id. at 11 f.  
231 Id. at 12 ff.  
232 Id. 
233 See Preliminary Document No. 21, supra note 225, annex.  
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b. Content of the New Draft 
Chapter I of the new draft dealt with the scope of a possible new convention. Article 1 
(substantive scope) provided that the convention applies to “agreements on the Choice of 
Court concluded in civil or commercial matters.”234 However, the absence of text under 
sub-section b and sub-section c indicated that this is not the final word on this issue. The 
provision also included language that gave an idea on what the convention would not 
apply to. Consumer contracts235 as well as individual contracts of employment236 were 
expressly excluded from the scope of the convention. Chapter II of the new approach 
included the jurisdictional rules, which provided a court of a contracting state with 
jurisdiction when that had been agreed upon in a choice of court agreement between the 
parties.237 Chapter III was intended to regulate recognition and enforcement issues. 
However, the informal working group had not prepared language for this part of a new 
approach. Chapter IV was reserved for final clauses covering issues like the limitation of 
jurisdiction and the relationship to other international instruments.  
                                                 
234 Id. art. 1 (1) lit. a. Article 3 provides a definition on the choice of court agreement issue. According to 
Art. 3 (1) a choice of court agreement “is an agreement whereby two or more parties designate, for the 
purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise between them in connection with a 
particular legal relationship, the courts of one country or one specific court to the exclusion of the 
jurisdiction of any other courts[ or the courts of a certain number of countries or certain specific courts 
to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts].” Art. 3 (2) furthermore provides that ”an 
agreement whereby parties have designated a court to decide disputes between them as provided in 
paragraph 1shall be deemed to exclude the jurisdiction of any other courts  unless the parties have 
otherwise agreed.” 
235 Id. art. 1 (2) lit. a. The working group issued the draft with a concrete definition of consumer contracts. 
According to Art. 1 (2) lit. a  “a consumer contract is an agreement between a natural person acting 
preliminary for personal, family or household purposes (the consumer) and another party acting for the 
purpose of its trade or profession, or between two consumers.”    
236 Id. art. 1 (2) lit b. 
237 Id. art. 1 (1). 
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c. Comments  
Even though the outcome of the second meeting was not more than a fraction of a draft 
this fraction marked a turning point in the development of the entire Hague Convention 
project. The scope of the convention was reduced to choice of court agreements in 
business-to-business relationships. Consumer contracts were expressly excluded. These 
key features determined all the subsequent negotiations.    
  
4. Third Meeting on the Judgments Project 
The next meeting was held from 25 to 28 March in 2003 in The Hague, which was 
immediately before the meeting of Commission I on General Affairs and Policy of the 
Hague Conference from 1 to 3 April 2003. The main purpose of setting up a working 
group was to prepare a text on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments in civil and commercial matters. This text was to be submitted to a Special 
Commission during the first half of 2003 followed by a Diplomatic Conference to be 
held, if possible, at the end of 2003. The third meeting on the judgments project fulfilled 
the first part of the requirements set forth in 2002 by issuing a nearly complete draft, the 
Preliminary Result of the Working Group (Preliminary Result).238 The document issued 
includes draft language that continues the work done in the previous two meetings. 
 
                                                 
238 See Preliminary Result of the Work of the Informal Working Group on the Judgments Project, 
Preliminary Document No 8 of March 2003 (corrected version) for the attention of the Special 
Commission of April 2003 on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference, available at 
ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/genaff_pd08e.pdf [hereinafter: Preliminary Result] 
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a. The Preliminary Result of the Working Group  
Chapter I dealing with the scope of the convention does not contain modifications 
compared to the draft issued after the second meeting of the working group. However, 
besides the exclusions already mentioned above further language excluding several 
matters was included. For example, Article 1 (3) Preliminary Result states that the 
convention shall not apply to proceedings related to the status and legal capacity of 
natural persons and maintenance obligations. The list provided in this part of the draft 
basically equals the list that was included in Article 1 of the Preliminary Draft 
Convention.239 One important change, however, must be pointed out. The Preliminary 
Result sets forth that the convention shall not apply to proceedings related to the “validity 
of patents, trademarks and [other intellectual property rights – to be defined].”240 Article 
2 of the Preliminary Result provides definitions that clarify the language of the 
convention, and Article 3 of the Preliminary Result241 sets forth the requirements for the 
formal validity.242       
 No changes were made to the draft that was issued after the second meeting of the 
working group with respect to the general jurisdictional rule. Thus, the rule continued to 
be that the court chosen in the agreement to settle all the disputes in the legal relationship 
between the parties had jurisdiction.243 However, that provision did not apply when all 
the parties involved are habitually resident in the state where the chosen court is 
                                                 
239 Compare Preliminary Result, id. art. 1 (3) with Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61 art. 1 (1). 
240 Preliminary Result, supra note 238, art. 1 (3) lit. k. For the discussion addressing the problem connected 
with this part of the provision see infra part VI.A.   
241 All articles without specification of source that are mentioned under IV.B.4 a. and b. refer to the 
Preliminary Result unless indicated otherwise. 
242 Id. art. 2 and 3. 
243 Id. art. 4 (1). 
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situated.244 That part of Article 4 provided that an international element is required in 
order to make the convention applicable. In other words, the convention would not be 
applicable in what are considered to be domestic cases.  
That the chosen court enjoys priority status is shown in Article 5, which states that 
courts in a contracting state other than the chosen court “shall decline jurisdiction or 
suspend proceedings.”245 Exceptions to this rule are first made in cases where the 
agreement is void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed in the eyes of the court 
that was not chosen, and second if the chosen court declines jurisdiction.246 A third 
exception again addresses the problem regarding the international element by stating that 
a court in a contracting state does not have to decline jurisdiction if all elements except 
the choice of court agreements itself are connected only to that contracting state.247  
 While the draft issued after the second meeting of the informal working group 
lacked language regarding recognition and enforcement, the Preliminary Result draft 
provided new provisions in this field. The general rule of Article 7 provides that the 
judgment of the court that was chosen must be recognized and enforced in other 
contracting states unless the catalogue of exceptions that make a refusal of the 
recognition and enforcement possible applies.248 Procedural rules in Articles 8 – 10 and 
                                                 
244 Id. art. 4 (2). 
245 Id. art. 5.  
246 Id. art. 5 lit. a, c. 
247 Id. art. 5 lit. c. 
248 Id. art. 7 (1). The possibilities to refuse recognition and enforcement are set forth in art. 7 (1) lit. a-e and 
art. 7 (2) lit. a, b. These provisions read as follows: “1. A judgment given by a court of a Contracting 
State designated in a choice of court agreement shall be recognized or enforced, as the case ma y be, in 
other Contracting States in accordance with this Chapter. Recognition or enforcement may be refused 
only if - a) the court addressed finds that the choice of court agreement was null and void; b) the 
document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document, including the essential elements 
of the claim, was not notified to the defendant in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to 
arrange for his defence; c) the judgment was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of 
procedure; [d) the judgment results from proceedings incompatible with fundamental principles of 
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language regarding the award of non-compensatory damages,249 which is similar to the 
approach in the Preliminary Draft Convention,250 as well as provisions that regard 
severability and the recognition and enforcement of settlements to which the chosen court 
has given its authority251 complete Chapter III. 
 Chapter IV of the draft contains general provisions regarding limitation of 
jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement as well as provisions that shall provide a 
uniform interpretation of the convention.252 Among other matters, Chapter V deals with 
the problem of signature, ratification and entry into force.253       
 
b. Comments 
The draft text on choice of court agreements issued after the third meeting of the Informal 
Working Group on the Judgments Project is the outcome of the new focus of the 
negotiations. While the language issued in former texts applied the convention to civil 
and commercial matters in general, the new approach narrowed this field of application 
drastically, covering only a small portion of what was originally planned to be covered. It 
remains to be seen whether this approach can make the entire project succeed and 
whether there is a chance of adding second stage issues. 
                                                                                                                                                 
procedure of the State addressed;] or e) recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible 
with the public policy of the State addressed. 2. In addition, recognition or enforcement of a judgment 
given by a court of a Contracting State designated in a choice of court agreement other than an 
exclusive choice of court agreement may be refused if - a) proceedings between the same parties and 
having the same subject matter are pending before a court that was seized prior to the court of origin, 
either in the State addressed or in another State, provided that in the latter case the court is expected to 
render a judgment capable of being recognized or enforced in the State addressed; or b) the judgment is 
inconsistent with a judgment rendered, either in the State addressed or in another State, provided that in 
the latter case the judgment is capable of being recognized or enforced in the State addressed.“ 
249 Id. art. 11. 
250 Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, art. 33.  
251 Preliminary Result, supra note 238, art. 12 and 13. 
252 Id. Chapter IV. 
253 Id. Chapter V. 
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5.  Special Commission Meeting in December 2003  
a. The Road to the Meeting 
Although of a very limited scope, the new draft brought an unforeseen level of agreement 
between the parties. At the meeting of the Commission I on General Affairs and Policy of 
the Hague Conference that met from 1 to 3 April 2003 it was decided that the negotiation 
parties should review the draft.254 The different governments were asked to deliver their 
official views and opinions to the Hague Conference by July 2003. The main question to 
be answered was whether the new draft could be the basis for the further negotiations on 
the convention. It was intended to have intense negotiations in December 2003 if the 
response to the new draft was positive.255  
 The new draft was discussed in industry as well as in consumer groups. Business 
groups expressed their general agreement with the draft. Much of the software industry’s 
sales, for example, are business-to-business transaction in an international setting. 
Therefore, the new draft would be, in the eyes of the business environment, a perfect tool 
to provide more predictability in jurisdiction and enforcement of judgement in this 
field.256 Consumer groups, on the other hand, raised concerns that the new approach 
could be an inflexible framework that is difficult to change.257 This is especially 
important keeping in mind that there are many second stage issues left to be addressed. 
                                                 
254 Conclusions of the Special Commission held from 1 – 3 April 2003 on General Affairs and Policy of the 
Conference (April 2003) at 11 , available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/wop/genaff_concl2003.pdf 
(last visited January 21, 2005).    
255 Id.  
256 William New, E – Commerce: Vote Nears On Global Treaty With E – Commerce Impact, in: National 
Journal’s Technological Daily, June 16, 2003, available at 
http://www.cptech.org/ecom/jurisdiction/haguejune1603.htm (last visited January 21, 2005). 
257 Id. 
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Another concern, already stressed above, was that firms could “forum shop” and force 
weaker parties to accept their provisions. 
 After Hans Van Loon, the secretary general of the Hague Conference, reviewed 
the opinions of the draft that were sent in by almost 30 countries, he concluded that the 
parties wanted to move forward with the negotiations based on the limited version of the 
convention. Although further clarification and improvement was suggested, “all replies 
concur in the view that the draft text should be put forward as the basis for the work.”258 
Therefore, the road was clear for a Special Commission to discuss the topic at a meeting 
in The Hague, Netherlands from 1 to 9 December 2003.  
 
b. The December 2003 Draft   
There were two main messages the Special Commission meeting delivered. First, there 
was the confirmation by all the members of the negotiations that there would be a 
convention on choice of court and enforcement of judgments. This is especially important 
because many negotiators doubted that all the discussions would lead to a result in the 
end. After the December 2003 meeting the Hague Convention seemed to have become a 
shared project. The second outcome is of substantive nature to emphasize this intention of 
new negotiations. A complete draft, the December 2003 Draft on Exclusive Choice of 
Court Agreements was proposed.259 Although nearly identical with the Preliminary 
                                                 
258 William New, Nations Give Go-Ahead to Limited Treaty on Disputes, in: National Journal’s 
Technology Daily, August 21, 2003, available at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/hague-jur-
commercial-law/2003-August/000816.html (last visited January 21, 2005).    
259 Special Commission on Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (1 to 9 December), Draft on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements, Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, Work. Doc. No 49E (December 2003), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/hubs/programs/Spring0409.01-09.03.pdf [hereinafter: December 2003 
Draft on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements or December 2003 Draft]. All articles without 
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Result, this time official conventional language was distributed to the general public by 
the drafting committee and not only by the working group. It demonstrates and manifests 
the will of the negotiating parties to move forward as they had decided months before.  
Like the Preliminary Result, the proposal by the drafting committee was limited to 
enforcing choice of court clauses within business-to-business contracts which identified 
which court would have exclusive jurisdiction if a dispute arises. Therefore, clauses that 
would give jurisdiction to more than one court would not be recognized by the draft. The 
draft would also enforce judgments made by those courts. However, there are some 
differences between the two latest drafts. Article 1 (4) sets forth that the proceedings 
which were excluded from the scope of the convention in Article 1 (3) remain covered by 
the convention if one of the matters referred to in this Article arises merely as an 
incidental question. That will especially become important in connection with claims 
involving intellectual property. Another point of discussion is that the European Union 
had favored language that would allow the Brussels Regulation to override the Hague 
Convention. Therefore, if an Italian business sues a German company under a contract 
containing a choice of court clause which makes a French court the chosen court, the 
Brussels Regulation and not a later Hague Convention would be applicable according to 
the will of the European Union. This could also be a major problem in finding later 
agreement on a final convention since there are situations that raise doubts on whether 
such a provision is workable. The following example is only one of these situations: a 
U.S. company that has a Finish branch office enters into a contract with an Austrian 
company containing a choice of court clause selecting U.S. courts. Would the European 
                                                                                                                                                 
specification of source that are mentioned under IV.B.5.b. refer to the December 2003 Draft unless 
indicated otherwise. 
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Union be able to claim that, because the Finish office is essentially involved in the 
contract, the case has to be heard in an EU court instead of an U.S. court even though the 
choice of court clause provides for the latter? This example demonstrates the potential for 
controversy that the European Union proposal causes.   
Changes were also made in Article 3 of the new draft. E-commerce companies 
and internet service providers complained about Article 3 of the Preliminary Result draft. 
Language in the draft could make it possible to subject not only traditional internet 
providers but also libraries and universities, which transmit and store lots of digital 
information for third parties, to extensive liability in foreign courts under choice of court 
agreements they have never seen nor assented to. The language about usage that the 
parties “knew or ought to have known” in Article 3 (d) of the Preliminary Result draft 
was replaced by requirements for an exclusive choice of court agreement. Such an 
agreement must be entered into or evidenced either in writing or “by any other means of 
communication which renders information accessible so as to be usable for subsequent 
reference.”260 Internet providers in the U.S. have pointed out that the phrase “any other 
means” remains unacceptable for them.261      
 
                                                 
260 December 2003 Draft, see id., Art. 2 (3) (a) and (b). 
261 Dugie Standeford, E – Commerce Disputes, Talks on Intellectual Property Issues To Resume Next Year, 
in: Warren’s Washington Internet Daily, December 10, 2003, available at 
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/hague-jur-commercial-law/2003-December/000847.html (last visited 
January 21, 2005). 
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C. Comments 
The December 2003 Draft on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements was accompanied 
by a draft report in March 2004.262 This report was drawn up for the attention of the 
Special Commission meeting in April 2004. It was by far the most detailed report to a 
draft that was ever released by the Hague Conference. It is a symbol for the confidence of 
the Conference and the negotiating parties that a future Convention is in sight. The report 
gives a detailed explanation to each Article of the draft that was released in December 
2003.  
The introduction to the report summarizes the changes that have been made with 
respect to the judgments project since the parties had decided to start over in their efforts 
to negotiate a future Hague Convention. It has become clear that the scope of the 
judgments project has changed from a convention that includes a wide range of rules on 
jurisdiction, enforcement, and recognition to a convention which has a far more modest 
objective. According to the draft report, the objective of the convention is “to make 
exclusive choice of court agreements as effective as possible in the context of 
international business.”263 The report expresses the hope that a future Hague Convention 
will have the same impact on choice of court agreements as the New York Convention of 
1958264 has had on arbitration agreements.265  
                                                 
262 Masato Dogauchi & Trevor C. Hartley, Preliminary Draft Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court 
Agreements, Draft Report, Preliminary Document No 25 of March 2004 drawn up for the attention of 
the Special Commission of April 2004 on Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/ 
wop/jdgm_pd25e.pdf (last visited January 21, 2005) [hereinafter: March 2004 Draft Report]. 
263 Id. at 6.   
264 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.   
265 March 2004 Draft Report, supra note 262 at 6.  
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In order to achieve this goal, three obligations are identified266 that have been 
pillars of the new approaches since the negotiators decided to start over in their effort to 
draft a convention. (1) The courts of the member states are obliged to hear the dispute. 
The key provision for this obligation is Article 4 of the December 2003 Draft on 
Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements. It sets forth that the chosen court has jurisdiction 
and must exercise it. (2) All other courts must decline jurisdiction. While Article 4 of the 
December 2003 Draft is addressed to the chosen court, Article 5 of the December 2003 
Draft is addressed to all other courts. Those must suspend or dismiss the proceedings 
before them if they concern the same claim. (3) The judgments rendered by the court 
must be recognized and enforced by the courts in other countries. Article 7 of the 
December 2003 Draft addresses the courts in which recognition for the judgment that was 
given by the chosen member state court is sought. Those courts must recognize and 
enforce the judgments that were given by the member state court that was designated in 
an exclusive choice of court agreement.  
This framework makes clear what is left from the original project of a mixed 
convention. The present draft provides for only exclusive choice of court agreements. 
Therefore, it covers only one of the original jurisdictional grounds that were included in 
the so called “white list” of the early drafts which contained the required bases of 
jurisdiction. A court is only required to exercise jurisdiction if it is selected in a choice of 
court agreement and other courts are only required to recognize and enforce judgments 
that were rendered by these courts. This fact demonstrates again that the scope of the new 
draft is very narrow. In contrast with the mixed convention, there is no “black list” with 
                                                 
266 Id.  
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prohibited bases of jurisdiction. Due to the fact that only the chosen member state court 
can exercise jurisdiction, however, all other courts are prohibited from deciding a case 
that is covered by the agreement.267 Therefore, the member state courts must refrain from 
exercising jurisdiction only in case the parties made an exclusive choice of a court to 
resolve disputes under the contract.  
Since the required and the prohibited bases of jurisdiction were reduced to one 
base of jurisdiction each, the list of permitted bases of jurisdiction under the old draft, the 
so called “grey list,” is very wide. It includes all cases that are not covered by an 
exclusive choice of court agreement.268 In these cases, the courts in the Contracting Sates 
can choose whether they wish to exercise jurisdiction. If they do, the courts in the other 
member states are free to enforce and recognize the rendered judgments. This even 
applies to some cases with exclusive choice of court agreements since consumer contracts 
and employment contracts are not included in the scope of the December 2003 Draft on 
Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
267 Id. at 7.   
268 Id. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PREPARATIONS FOR THE JUNE 2005 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE 
 
The Convention project received expedited status in 2005 and therefore enjoys priority 
among the Hague Conference projects.269 Whether the year 2005 is going to be “The 
Year of the Hague Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements” will probably 
be decided by the outcome of the June 2005 Diplomatic Conference. It was scheduled for 
June 14 to 30, 2005.270   
 
A. The April 2004 Special Commission Meeting  
During a Special Commission meeting on the judgment project from 21 to 27 April 2004, 
the Hague Conference reconsidered the December 2003 Draft Convention on Exclusive 
Choice of Court Agreements and the March 2004 Draft Report that had been drawn up 
for the attention of this Special Commission. The various delegations tried to improve the 
draft and dealt with the remaining issues. The outcome of this meeting was the April 
2004 Draft on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements,271 which was issued in May 2004. 
Much of the draft is identical with that of December 2003. It does include some important 
changes and additions. Like most of the drafts issued by the Hague Conference in the 
                                                 
269 William New, Expediting Global E-Commerce Talks, January 05, 2005, available at 
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/hague-jur-commercial-law/2005-January/000944.html (last visited 
January 21, 2005). 
270 This late date was due to a request by the United States. However, a reason for the requested delay was 
not given. 
271 Special Commission on Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (21 to 27 April 2004), Draft on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements, Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, Work. Doc. No 110E (April 2004), available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_wd110_e.pdf (last visited January 21, 2005) [hereinafter: April 
2004 Draft]. The full text of the April 2004 Draft can also be found in the annex to this thesis.  
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past, the April 2004 Draft also included a text with some alternatives. However, it is 
important to point out that there was far less bracketed language in this draft than in past 
drafts. The draft consisted of thirty one Articles which are analyzed by the December 
2004 Draft Report.272 The Diplomatic Conference in June 2005 will discuss the April 
2004 Draft in light of the December 2004 Draft Report. The report will itself be the main 
basis for all of the discussions at the Conference. While the April 2004 Draft is fourteen 
pages long, the accompanying report is sixty pages long and is extremely detailed. It 
reads like a detailed commentary to the draft. The December 2004 Draft Report is an 
edited and improved version of the March 2004 Draft Report, which is why both reports 
are very similar. Reading the report seems to leave no doubt that the negotiating parties 
are serious about adopting a final convention in June 2005. However, hundreds of 
footnotes demonstrate that there was and is going to be much discussion in detailed areas 
between the negotiating parties and that there are still areas of disagreement.       
 
B. The April 2004 Draft Convention on the Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements   
1. Scope   
The scope of the convention is framed by three limitations. According to Article 1 of the 
April 2004 Draft, the convention is only applicable in international cases that include a 
choice of court agreement regarding a civil or commercial matter.273 This positive 
definition of the convention scope is accompanied by a negative one in Article 2 of the 
                                                 
272 Masato Dogauchi & Trevor C. Hartley, Preliminary Draft Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court 
Agreements, Draft Report, Preliminary Document No 26 of December 2004 drawn up for the attention 
of the Twentieth Diplomatic Session on Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/ 
wop/jdgm_pd26e.pdf (last visited January 21, 2005) [hereinafter: December 2004 Draft Report]. 
273 April 2004 Draft, supra note 271, art. 1 (1). 
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April 2004 Draft which excludes consumer and employment contracts from the scope of 
the convention.274  
 Article 1275 gives two definitions for what is regarded as an international case. 
While Article 1 (2) defines “international” for the purpose of the rules on jurisdiction in 
Chapter II of the draft, Article 1 (3) gives a definition regarding the rules on recognition 
and enforcement in Chapter III. A case is regarded international in the first context if at 
least one of the involved parties is not a resident in the state of the court seized, or if 
another element that is in some kind related to the dispute276 has a connection to another 
state. That means a case is international with regard to jurisdiction unless the parties are 
both resident in the Contracting State of the court seized and the relationship of the 
parties and all other relevant elements are connected only with this particular state.277 In 
determining whether the requirements for an application of the convention are met, the 
perspective of the seized court is decisive. If two parties resident in Sweden enter into a 
contract with an exclusive choice of court agreement that provides a French court with 
exclusive jurisdiction over the case which regards a civil matter and one of the parties 
sues in a Swedish court, this court does not have to apply the convention since both 
parties are resident in the Contracting state of the court seized.278 However, if a party sues 
in France the French court will determine whether the convention is applicable. From the 
French court’s perspective the case would be international since none of the parties is 
resident in France. Therefore, the French court would be required by Article 5 of the 
                                                 
274 Id., art. 2.   
275 All articles without specification of source that are mentioned under V.B. refer to the April 2004 Draft 
unless indicated otherwise. 
276 The mere location of the chosen court does not qualify as one of those elements. 
277 April 2004 Draft, supra note 271, art. 1 (2). 
278 That presupposes that all other elements are connected with Sweden only. 
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April 2004 draft to hear the case. The December 2004 Draft Report remarks that such a 
setting could lead to a judgment that is inconsistent with the situation in which two 
parties that are resident in the same state would expect from a court in that state.279 The 
report draws into doubt whether this is the result that the negotiating states intended. 
These apprehensions are hard to understand, however, since contracting parties will 
usually have a specific reason for choosing a court in another state. The choice of a 
“neutral” court without researching the consequences of this choice seems especially 
unlikely considering that the convention is applicable in the business-to-business 
relationship only. In such a relationship the typical “take it or leave it” contract that is 
often found in a business-to-consumer setting is less likely to occur. However, it is not 
said that such settings would never occur. In the world of e-commerce, a small family 
business doing business with a big corporation over the internet could easily be in a 
position similar to that of a consumer.  
 Article 1 (3) sets forth that a case is regarded international for purposes of Chapter 
III (recognition and enforcement) if the judgment that is sought to be recognized and 
enforced is foreign. This definition makes it possible that even cases which were not 
considered international under the Article 1 (2) definition can be considered international 
under this definition. If the Swedish parties in the example above choose a court in 
Sweden in their agreement, according to Article 1 (2) the case is not considered 
international. However, if one of the parties tries to enforce the Swedish judgment in the 
Netherlands, the case would become international for the Dutch court, for example. The 
                                                 
279 See December 2004 Draft Report, supra note 272 at paragraph 12.   
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Dutch court would have to enforce and recognize the judgment given the case that none 
of the exceptions in Article 9 apply.       
 Article 1 also requires that a case including an exclusive choice of court 
agreement concerns a civil or commercial matter. The latter is a standard in many 
international conventions. The limitation to civil and commercial matters necessarily 
excludes criminal and public law matters from the convention’s scope.280 The reasons for 
choosing an exclusive choice of court agreement instead of a non-exclusive one become 
clear in the following example. Assuming one of the Swedish parties in the original 
example above (French court was chosen in the agreement) sue in an Italian court. For 
the Italian court, the case is international since none of the parties is resident in Italy. If 
Article 1 would not require an exclusive choice of court agreement, then the Italian court 
would be entitled to hear the case even if the case was brought to a French court later. 
The December 2004 Draft Report states that a non-exclusive choice of court agreement 
would raise issues of lis pendens that would be difficult to resolve.281 It was pointed out 
above, however, that this matter was an area of early agreement in the first draft ever 
issued on the matter.282 Therefore, the report should not use the lis pendens issue as a 
reason for narrowing the scope of the convention. The convention as it stands right now 
could not work with non exclusive choice of court agreements. Article 5 and Article 7 
would not make sense in such a case.                                       
 Article 3 sets forth a detailed definition of what is considered an “exclusive 
choice of court agreement.” There are five requirements to the definition: (1) agreement 
                                                 
280 Id. at paragraph 15.  
281 Id. at paragraph 14. 
282 See supra part III.C.6. 
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between the parties, (2) proper form, (3) exclusivity, (4) reciprocity, and (5) the 
designation must be “for the purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise 
in connection with a particular legal relationship.”  
 Whether there is an agreement between the parties is determined by the law of the 
State of the chosen court. No express language is provided, which shows that such an 
approach is favored to an approach applying autonomous rules like those laid down by 
the European Court of Justice for the Brussels Convention.283 However, references in 
other Articles of the April 2004 Draft to the application of State law strongly suggest 
such a result.284 The requirements for a proper form of an exclusive choice of court 
agreement are laid down in Article 3 (c). In the words of Article 3 (b) a choice is 
exclusive if the agreement “designates the courts of one Contracting State or one or more 
specific courts in one Contracting State unless the parties have expressly provided 
otherwise.” Therefore, many different ways of choosing a court can be exclusive with 
respect to Article 3 (b). The parties can choose the “courts of Germany.”285 They can also 
choose a specific court like the “Amtsgericht Hamburg.” It would also be an exclusive 
choice if the parties determine that either the “Amtsgericht Hamburg” or the 
“Amtsgericht Rostock” should hear the case. The parties can choose as many specific 
courts as they want as long as all those courts are in the same member state. It would also 
be exclusive if the parties agree that party A may sue party B only in the “Amtsgericht 
Hamburg” and party B may sue party A only in the “Amtsgericht Rostock” as long as 
both courts are in the same state. The convention always speaks of states and never 
                                                 
283 See, e.g., Estasis Salotti and Colzani v. RÜWA, Case 24/76, [1976] ECR 1831: [1977] 1 CMLR 345.   
284 References to the application of State law can be found in Articles 5(1), 7(a), 7(b), 9(1)(a), and 9(1)(b).   
285 In this case German law would decide which court will hear the dispute.  
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makes a distinction between states and nations for example. Referring to a state, however, 
is not very specific when it comes to non-unified legal systems. For those federal states, 
Article 22 of the draft sets forth that the term “State” can refer to the state as a whole or 
to one of the territorial units within the state. Therefore, it would be an exclusive choice 
of court agreement if the Swedish parties in the example above designate “the courts of 
Canada” or “the courts of British Columbia.” A clause that designates “the state courts of 
California or the federal courts located in that state” would also be regarded as 
exclusive.286  
The last two requirements of the definition are less complex. Reciprocity just 
means that the convention only applies to exclusive choice of court agreements that 
designate courts in a Contracting State, making it impossible for the convention to apply 
if the parties chose a court of a state that has not signed and ratified the convention. The 
last requirement (designation for the purpose of deciding disputes that have arisen or may 
arise in connection with a particular legal relationship) makes clear that the choice of 
court clause can include disputes that have already arisen and also covers future disputes. 
Furthermore, this requirement can restrict the choice of court clause to past or future 
disputes.287     
 Article 2 excludes certain matters from the scope of the convention. The most 
important matters in this context are consumer contracts and contracts of employment. 
The reasons for these exclusions were already discussed above. Besides those matters, 
Article 2 expressly provides an entire laundry list of excluded matters,288 which are 
                                                 
286 See December 2004 Draft Report, supra note 272 at paragraph 72. 
287 See id. at paragraph 67. 
288 The most important of these matters is the exclusion of some intellectual property rights which will be 
discussed later.  
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mainly excluded because they touch third party or public interests. As soon as such are 
involved it is not reasonable for the contracting parties to dispose of the particular matter 
between themselves.289 However, the matters in Article 1 (2) are only excluded if they do 
not arise merely as an incidental question.290 Incidental questions are such that a court has 
to decide in order to render a judgment.291  
 
2. Article 5   
The rules with regard to jurisdiction can be found in Article 5 (1) of the April 
2004 Draft. This provision sets forth that the designated court “shall have jurisdiction to 
decide a dispute to which the agreement applies, unless the agreement is null and void 
under the law of that State.” Whether an agreement is null and void has to be determined 
by the law of the State of the chosen court and refers primarily to grounds like fraud, 
mistake, misrepresentation, duress, and lack of capacity. Article 5 (1) not only provides a 
court with jurisdiction but also requires it to hear the case. In Article 5 (2) the draft 
clarifies that the designated court cannot decline jurisdiction on the ground that the 
dispute should be decided in a court of another state. Since this rule does not apply with 
respect to a court in the same state, special questions arise with respect to non-unified 
legal systems in this context as well.292 Furthermore, it is important to point out that the 
doctrines of lis pendens and forum non conveniens addressed above cannot serve as a 
ground for rejecting the jurisdiction of a court in another state. Article 3 (3) provides 
                                                 
289 See December 2004 Report, supra note 272 at paragraph 20. 
290 April 2004 Draft, supra note 271, art. 2 (3).  
291 See December 2004 Report, supra note 272 at paragraph 55. 
292 For questions that arise in this context see December 2004 Report, supra note 272 at paragraphs 95 ff. 
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rules for the internal allocation of jurisdiction among the courts of a contracting state and 
makes clear that the first two paragraphs do not have any affect on it.293   
 
3. Article 7 and 9 
Assume one of the Swedish parties in the example above brings an action that is covered 
by the choice of court agreement between them in a court in Belgium even though the 
agreement provides a court in France with jurisdiction. This situation is typical for the 
cases to which Article 7 of the April 2004 Draft applies.294 Article 7 addresses all the 
courts that were not designated in the agreement and requires them to “suspend or 
dismiss the proceedings” even if their national law would provide them with jurisdiction. 
Without a provision like this, an exclusive choice of court agreement would be worthless. 
Even though the draft does not expressly explain what it means by “proceedings” it is 
clear that this term covers all proceedings that are inconsistent with the choice of court 
agreement.295  There are five exceptions in Article 7 a) to e) providing cases in which the 
provision does not apply. According to the first exception, Article 7 does not apply if the 
agreement between the parties is void under the law that the chosen court applies. In this 
case the court not chosen must apply the law of the chosen court and not its own. 
Therefore the court in Belgium would have to apply French law in order to determine 
whether the agreement is null and void. The second exception makes Article 7 not 
applicable if a party lacked capacity to enter into an agreement. This exception has to be 
determined by the law of the state of the court that was seized and not by the chosen 
                                                 
293 Id. at paragraphs 101 ff.  
294 Article 11 of the April 2004 Draft makes sure that Article 7 April 2004 Draft also precludes the 
recognition or the enforcement of a judgment that is rendered in contravention of an exclusive choice of 
court agreement.  
295 See December 2004 Report, supra note 272 at paragraph 119. 
 70 
court. In this case the Belgian court would have to apply its own rules including its own 
choice-of-law rules. There is also a connection between the two exceptions since lack of 
capacity would make the agreement null and void in the sense of the first exception. 
Therefore, capacity has to be determined by the law of the court seized and by the court 
that was chosen in the agreement.296  
While the first two exceptions to Article 7 are of general nature and can be found 
in other conventions, exceptions three and four are special. These exceptions cover cases 
of serious injustice, violations of the public policy of the court seized of the matter, and 
situations when the agreement cannot be performed because of exceptional reasons.297 
All of those exceptions must be construed narrowly since they would otherwise 
undermine the object and purpose of the convention. The fact that the last of the 
alternatives only comes into play in cases of war in the chosen state for example 
demonstrates how narrow these exceptions are to be construed.298 The last of the five 
exceptions allows the seized court to exercise jurisdiction despite Article 7 if the chosen 
court has decided not to hear the case.        
Article 5, 7, and 9 of the April 2004 Draft are the three pillars of the “new style” 
of the Hague Convention project. The third of these pillars, Article 9, simply states that a 
judgment that was rendered by a court designated in an exclusive choice of court 
agreement between two parties must be recognized and enforced in the courts of all other 
member states. Article 9 includes six exceptions which, if they apply, give the court the 
choice whether to recognize and enforce the particular judgment or not.299 This is due to 
                                                 
296 Id. at paragraph 125. 
297 For a detailed explanation of these exceptions see id. paragraphs 126 ff.  
298 Id. at paragraph 129. 
299 For a detailed discussion of the six exceptions see id. at paragraph 136 ff.  
 71 
the language chosen by the drafters (“[...] may be refused [...]”). In the context of 
recognition and enforcement it is important to point out that a future Hague Convention 
would not require a member state to grant a remedy that is not available under its law.300 
However, it requires them to recognize and enforce the given judgment in a way that 
gives the best possible effect under the rules available.301 This fact will become important 
especially with respect to the enforcement of punitive damages in countries that do not 
provide such a remedy in their legal system.            
 
C. Comments 
The June 2005 Diplomatic Conference may well result in the adoption of a Hague 
Convention that is ready for signature and ratification. Sometimes one step back can 
mean two steps forward. The atmosphere during and after the Special Commission 
meeting in December 2003 shows that all sides were trying to push the Hague project 
forward. It seems that the fear of making all the work pointless by not drafting a final 
convention encouraged the participating parties to proceed.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
300 Id. at paragraph 50. 
301 Id.  
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CHAPTER 6 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF IP-RIGHTS AND E-COMMERCE 
 
More than a decade had passed since the beginnings of drafting a Hague Convention on 
judgments in 1992. This is not a long period if one keeps in mind the relatively slow 
development of the law in general and the difficulty of the matter to be addressed in the 
proposed convention. There are fields of law, however, where ten years can seam an 
eternity. In the context of intellectual property302 rights, the internet is a challenge that 
forces both lawmakers and practitioners to manage a rapid and continuing process of 
adaptation and adjustment. Moreover, the internet has an even bigger impact in e-
commerce. In 1992, e-commerce was an expression only a few could understand since 
the internet was not readily available even in developed countries. Thus, questions of 
intellectual property and e-commerce were not really considered to be a major factor in 
the Hague Convention negotiation process.303 Both issues, however, had a very important 
impact on the negotiations and were often fields of major controversy. 
 
A. Intellectual Property Rights   
1. Article 12 Preliminary Draft Convention 
In the Preliminary Draft Convention, intellectual property rights were addressed in 
Article 12, which provided exclusive bases of jurisdiction for intellectual property 
                                                 
302 Hereinafter: IP. 
303 Some commentators even stated that “it seemed that the drafters had ignored completely that new-
fangled thing called the Internet,“ see Hankin, supra note 75 at 1297.    
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matters.304 Article 12 (4) of the Preliminary Draft Convention sets forth language305 that 
was strongly criticized306 and often described as “completely unworkable.”307 This 
paragraph clarifies that both types of intellectual property rights, registered and not 
registered rights, were intended to be separated and that Article 12 (4) of the Preliminary 
Draft Convention only covers registered rights.308 As a consequence patents and 
trademarks are addressed by Article 12 (4) Preliminary Draft Convention. Copyright 
infringements, however, are treated as torts according to Article 10 of the Preliminary 
Draft Convention. To the United States delegation, this result was not very reasonable 
since copyrights may be registered in the United States and are often registered. As far as 
the concept of “unregistered” or “common law” trademarks is concerned, it is important 
to point out that the Draft Convention does not make a distinction between the 
aforementioned trademarks and registered trademarks. Trademarks are expressly 
mentioned in the text of Article 12 (4) Preliminary Draft Convention.309  
By distinguishing between the different types of action that are related to 
intellectual property problems, this provision makes another separation worth 
mentioning. According to the language in the provision, the Convention would apply to 
questions regarding validity but not apply to problems related to infringement or 
                                                 
304 Preliminary Draft Convention, supra  note 61, art. 12. 
305 See id., paragraph 4. This paragraph reads as follows: “In proceedings which have as their object the 
registration, validity, [or] nullity [, or revocation or infringement,] of patents, trade marks, designs or 
other similar rights required to be deposited or registered, the courts of the Contracting State in which 
the deposit or registration has been applied for, has taken place or, under the terms of an international 
convention, is deemed to have taken place, have exclusive jurisdiction. This shall not apply to copyright 
or any neighbouring rights, even though registration or deposit of such rights is possible.“    
306 See, e.g., Kyle Grimshaw, International Upheaval: Patent Independence Protectionists and the Hague 
Conference, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 20, 13 ff. (2001).      
307 See, e.g., Hankin, supra note 75 at 1297. 
308 See Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, art. 12 (4). 
309 See Brand, supra note 35, footnote 19. 
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revocation, since these problems are still in bracketed text.310 In other words the question 
of whether infringement actions should also be brought exclusively in the state of 
registration was left open.311  
 The reactions to Article 12 of the Preliminary Draft convention were negative. As 
addressed above it was described as unworkable and faced a wide front of opposition, 
and in particular, criticism in the United States. The United States Patent and Trademark 
Office made an attempt to get a general public response to the discussed approach by 
publishing a note in the Federal Register.312 The consensus of the replies313 can be 
summarized in the conclusion that the approach in the Draft Convention is not a “model 
of clarity.”314 While some industry spokesmen agreed that questions of validity rather 
than questions of infringement should be entitled to exclusive jurisdiction,315 others 
believed that not even questions of validity should receive exclusive jurisdiction.316 
Although many experts agreed with the content of Article 12 (4) Preliminary Draft 
Convention in general or at least held the opinion that it was a good basis, many 
questions were left unanswered.317 Article 12 Preliminary Draft Convention also did not 
deal with differences in systems of intellectual property rights protection in a satisfactory 
way.318             
                                                 
310 Id. 
311 See Brand, supra note 35 at 596. 
312 65 Fed. Reg. 61, 306 (Oct. 17, 2000). 
313 The public responses to the request of the United States Patent and Trademark Office are collected on its 
website, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/tmcybpiracy/haguecomments.pdf (last visited 
January 21, 2005) [hereinafter Public Responses]. 
314 Letter from Kimbley L. Muller, President, International Trade Mark Association, to Q. Todd Dickinson 
(Dec. 1, 2000). Public Responses, id. at 36. 
315 See, e.g., “Comments of the Software & Information Industry Association“, Public Responses, supra 
note 313 at 85-96. 
316 See, e.g., “Response to Federal Register Notice,“ Public Responses, supra note 313 at 100. 
317 For a summary of the most important questions see Brand, supra note 35 at 596 f. 
318 Id. at 596.    
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2. The June 2001 Diplomatic Conference and its Aftermath 
a. The Conference   
After several expert meetings on intellectual property the discussions during the June 
2001 Diplomatic Conference focused on the different types of intellectual property rights. 
These rights and the legal systems created to promote and protect them were analyzed in 
order to find a compromise that could satisfy all the participating delegations.319 As 
addressed above, the Interim Text draft does contain bracketed language and many 
alternatives indicating further need for discussion. This is especially true for Article 12 
Interim Text regarding the intellectual property matter.320 Although the bracketed 
language might be confusing, the message of the drafters of the Interim Text is clear: The 
main issue addressed by the delegation members was whether proceedings for the 
infringement of patents, marks, and such other rights that might be covered by Article 12 
Interim Text should fall within the exclusive jurisdiction or not.321 
 Due to all of the bracketed language, this approach created more problems than it 
resolved. In comparison to the approach in the Preliminary Draft Convention, even more 
questions remained unanswered. Should problems regarding patents and marks be treated 
differently than problems dealing with copyright issues, as done in the Interim Text? If 
there were exclusive jurisdiction for patent and trademark issues, should these issues only 
apply to questions of validity322 or also to questions of infringement?323 However, one 
question seemed key not only to the further development in the negotiations of the 
                                                 
319 Id. at 600. 
320 Three different proposals have been made with respect to the treatment of intellectual property in the 
Interim Text. See Interim Text, supra note 178, art. 12. 
321 Id. footnote 81.   
322 This would correspond with the approach in the Brussels Convention. 
323 For other important questions in the same context, see Brand, supra note 35 at 601.   
 76 
intellectual property matters but also the negotiation of the proposed Hague Convention 
as a whole. The question was whether it is better that intellectual property rights be 
excluded from the scope of the convention. The answer to this question will be discussed 
later in this thesis. In sum, the issue remained whether intellectual property right 
problems would be too connected with other subjects like tort and contract issues, making 
separate treatment undesirable.        
 
b. Alternative Proposals 
While the original Hague Convention was intended to be broad and inclusive in order to 
cover most civil and commercial litigation, an alternative proposal dealt exclusively with 
issues of intellectual property. This proposal was suggested by the American law 
Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg is appropriately named the “2001 Dreyfuss-Ginsburg-
Proposal.”324 This proposal addressed two questions. Firstly, the drafters of this proposal 
intended to make the U.S. Intellectual Property Bar reflect on the possibility of creating a 
regime for international enforcement of intellectual property law judgments in the event 
that the Hague Conference project failed or did not cover rules for the solution of 
disputes in the field of intellectual property law.325 Secondly, the proposal raises the 
question of whether a convention which focused exclusively on intellectual property 
matters and which raised questions in this unique context would have advantages over the 
Hague Convention solution.326 One of the main reasons for providing an alternative 
                                                 
324 The text of the proposed convention and explanations to the single articles can be found in Rochelle C. 
Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in 
Intellectual Property Matters, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1065 (2002) [hereinafter Dreyfuss – Ginsburg – 
Proposal].   
325 Id. at 1065.  
326 Id.  
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approach was the creation of efficiency in international intellectual property disputes327 
and the new challenges that are posed by the new cyber world realities.328 
The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg-Proposal, which is also designed in a mixed convention 
style,329 was adapted from the Preliminary Draft Convention,330 though significant 
changes were made. First, the scope of the proposal was limited to countries that are 
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the “Agreement on Trade – 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,”331 the so called “TRIPs – 
Agreement.”332 Thus, the proposal basically covered the same rights that are covered by 
the intellectual property portion of TRIPs, with the addition of three extensions and one 
exception to the rights included by the TRIPs – Agreement.333 The main idea behind the 
use of established TRIPs rules is easily identifiable: Countries joining the TRIPs – 
Agreement have agreed to enforce intellectual property laws and have worked out special 
dispute resolution proceedings which they can apply if the enforcement process should 
fail.334 Forum shopping to undermine or weaken the several approaches of the different 
nations to govern the relationship between users and owners of intellectual property is 
meant to be outweighed by this scope limitation.335 Because of its general and broader 
                                                 
327 Id. at 1066. 
328 See Kimberly A. Moore & Francesco Parisi, Rethinking Forum Shopping, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1325, 
1326 (2002) 
329 See Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 324 at 1069. 
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scope, the Proposed Hague Convention was often confronted with this forum shopping 
argument.336 
Of special importance was the exception mentioned above that excluded patent 
litigation from the scope of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg-Proposal.337 The proposal focused on 
copyrights with the intention of addressing disputes regarding copyright protected 
material and therefore dealt with concerns raised by copyright owners.338 The Dreyfuss-
Ginsburg-Proposal also differed in other area from the Preliminary Draft Convention. 
Changes were made, or additional provisions were provided regarding jurisdictional 
rules,339 contract disputes, infringement actions, consolidation, remedies, and choice of 
law.340  
 
c. Aftermath of the 2001 Conference  
As the many alternatives in the Interim Text indicated, there was still a need for further 
discussion on the matter of intellectual property rights in the Convention. During the first 
meeting of the Informal Working Group on the Judgments Project there was discussion 
on whether it would be reasonable to exclude some intellectual property rights from the 
treaty. Patents and trademarks were intended to be excluded from the treaty while 
copyrights were to be covered. The delegations gathered again at the second meeting of 
                                                 
336 See id. Although an inclusion of patent litigation is not intended, bracketed language demonstrates how 
patents could be treated in the Dreyfuss – Ginsburg – Proposal.  
337 Id., art. 1(1). 
338 See Roberta J. Morris, International Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in the Era of Global 
Networks: Irrelevance of, Goals for, and Comments on the Current Proposals, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1213, 1217 f. (2002). 
339 While the Brussels Convention uses personal jurisdiction to identify a single most appropriate forum for 
a dispute resolution the Dreyfuss – Ginsburg – Proposal identified a set of fora with adjudicatory 
authority over the parties. This approach also differed from the rules set forth in the Preliminary Draft 
Convention, which uses personal jurisdiction as a tool to create a narrow range of choices that are 
appropriate.   
340 For the changes in detail see Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 324 at 1069 ff. 
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the Informal Working Group on the Judgments Project. One state came up with the 
suggestion to include all intellectual property rights into the scope of the convention if the 
convention were to be limited to choice of court clauses,341 which was the current 
approach in the negotiations of the Hague Convention at that time. The idea behind this 
suggestion was to protect commercial parties, which usually include choice of court 
clauses in their licensing agreements. Such a convention was considered to be the ideal 
tool to intensify and protect such decisions by the parties involved.342 The reason for the 
protection was respect of the parties’ choice. If they agreed on a court to settle their 
disputes, this court should be able to decide all issues, and therefore, all intellectual 
property matters and not only some. 
An objection one could raise could be the infringement case problem that was 
already identified earlier in the 2001 negotiations. In these infringement cases the validity 
would be raised by the infringer as a defense in order to get exclusive jurisdiction since 
validity was subject to exclusive jurisdiction under the convention.343 Pure infringement 
cases between parties that were not bound by any contractual relationship and that had no 
other relationship of any kind would be subject to another exclusive jurisdiction besides 
the exclusive tort jurisdiction. But the fact that the substantive scope of the treaty was 
narrowed to choice of court clauses makes the difference in comparison with the 
negotiations in 2001 and before. With the new approach it became very unlikely that such 
a setting could lead to an exclusive jurisdiction that is unjustified since the infringing 
person could now only be one of the parties. Thus, the problems identified during the 
                                                 
341 See Preliminary Document No. 21, supra note 225 at 11.  
342 Id. The result of the application of a convention taking all this in account should, according to this 
position, apply only inter partes.   
343 Id. 
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negotiations in 2001 would seem to be solved since they will not arise in the contract-
license-litigation.344 To meet some concerns it was suggested that express language be 
included providing that any judgment rendered on the basis of a choice of court clause 
would neither have any effect on registration authorities nor on the validity of a 
trademark.345 Other participants indicated agreement with the inclusion of all intellectual 
property rights as long as the modifications described above are explicitly mentioned in 
the convention.346  
There was much interest in how the third meeting of the Working Group on the 
Judgments Project would deal with the intellectual property issue in the newly edited 
draft that was announced for this meeting. When the text of the treaty was first shown, 
the intellectual property issue that was earlier identified as one of the most controversial 
matters was set aside and made part of the second stage issues. However, at the beginning 
of the new drafting process it was pointed out that the intellectual property issue could 
reappear on the agenda of matters that were likely to be included within the scope of the 
Hague Convention later on. One main reason for the confidence expressed in the 
reappearance of intellectual property rights in the text was the fact that Andrea Schultz, 
first secretary of the Informal Working Group on the Judgments Project was an expert in 
intellectual property law.347  
The early hopes of an inclusion of intellectual property matters in the Convention 
probably disappeared, since the Preliminary Result draft of the Working Group in form of 
a new draft, which was released at the third meeting of the Working Group, declared that 
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346 Id. at 12. 
347 See Anandashankar Mazumdar, supra note 203. 
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the convention would not apply to proceedings related to the “validity of patents, 
trademarks and [other intellectual property rights – to be defined].”348 The drafters thus 
excluded the issue of validity of patents and trademarks from the scope of the convention 
and indicated by the bracketed language provided above that exclusion of other 
intellectual property rights could be possible.   
The December 2003 Draft on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreement, did not lead 
to a conclusion regarding the intellectual property issue either. Proceedings involving the 
validity of patents and trademarks as well as other intellectual property rights whose 
validity arises from their registration were still not included in the convention.349 As 
mentioned above, however, Article 1 (4) of the December 2003 Draft made it possible to 
cover those matters if they arise merely as an incidental question. The inclusion of this 
provision rendered an old questions but this time in a new context: should a particular 
country’s court be able to hear a case involving an incidental question related to a patent 
or trademark when the patent or trademark had not been granted in that country? A 
separate discussion of this matter is not necessary, since the main problem remains the 
same in the sense that it involves a decision by a court in a case involving intellectual 
property rights whose validity arises from their registration in another country.  
 
3. The April 2004 Draft 
The intellectual property provisions in the April 2004 draft have been reformulated. 
However, despite of the different wording in Article 2 (2)(k) of the April 2004 Draft there 
is no indication that a change in policy was intended. The fact that the entire Article 2 
                                                 
348 Preliminary Result, supra note 238, art. 1 (3) lit. k.    
349 Id. art. 1 (3) (k)(1). 
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(2)(k) of the April 2004 Draft is set forth in bracketed language is a sign of the lack of 
agreement on the intellectual property issues. According to the latest draft language, 
copyrights and related rights350 are still fully covered by the convention whereas all other 
intellectual property rights are excluded from the scope, “except in proceedings pursuant 
to a contract which licenses or assigns such intellectual property rights.”351 This wording 
is more confusing than the one chosen in the December 2003 Draft, and it is not entirely 
clear at first glance what the drafters intended to express with this language. However, 
comparing the December 2003 approach and the present one makes clear that they both 
basically come to the same policy result: copyrights and related rights are fully included 
in the scope of the convention and questions with respect to the validity of all other 
intellectual property rights, like patents and trademarks for example, are not included. 
The discussions below will demonstrate how the wording in the April 2004 Draft reaches 
this policy result. 
 The complicated wording in Article 2 (2)(k) April 2004 Draft was due to the fact 
that the negotiators did not want the validity of patents and trademarks, for example, to 
be covered by the convention. However, they tried to include disputes over licenses in 
other countries into the scope of the convention. The problem with this intention was that 
all a violator of a license would have to do in order to prevent the application of the 
convention is to argue that the particular intellectual property right is not valid.352 The 
                                                 
350 If the convention speaks of copyright “related rights” it refers to the specific use of an already existing 
work by someone else than the author of this work. Broadcasters, record producers, and actors are 
examples for subjects that would benefit under this part of the provision.  See December 2004 Report, 
supra note 272 at paragraph 38.  
351 April 2004 Draft, supra note 271, art. 2 (2)(k).  
352 See William New, Negotiators See Progress on International Jurisdiction Treaty, in: Techdaily, 
December 16, 2003, available at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/hague-jur-commercial-law/2003-
December/000854.html (visited January 21, 2005). 
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wording in Article 2 (2)(k) April 2004 Draft was set forth to avoid such scenarios. 
“Proceedings pursuant to a contract” does not mean anything else than proceedings to 
enforce substantive rights under a contract, to obtain damages for the breach of such 
rights, to obtain payment of royalties under the contract, to interpret a contract, to set it 
aside, to declare that it never existed, or to obtain a declaration of non-liability under it.353 
All those proceedings concern either the transfer or the use of intellectual property rights 
other than copyrights and related rights. Therefore, questions regarding the validity of 
such intellectual property rights cannot be considered “proceedings pursuant to a 
contract” which means that they are not covered by the convention if they arise as an 
principal issue.354 However, if they arise merely as an incidental question, they are 
covered according to Article 2 (3) of the April 2004 Draft.  
Even in this case, though, rulings on these questions would not be subject to 
recognition and enforcement according to Article 10 (2) of the April 2004 Draft. 
Therefore, if the violator of a patent license agreement raises the invalidity of the patent 
as a defense to a claim that is covered by the convention, the court can decide on the 
validity issue as an incidental question. Despite the defense and the court ruling on it, the 
proceedings would still be within the scope of the convention as a consequence of Article 
2 (3) April 2004 Draft. The ruling on the validity issue, however, is not enforceable under 
the convention due to Article 10 (2) April 2004 Draft.355  
 After this clarification it remains to be pointed out that negotiating parties 
intended to cover a wide range of contracts that deal with the transfer and use of 
                                                 
353 See December 2004 Draft Report, supra note 272 at paragraph 40. 
354 See April 2004 Draft, supra note 271, art. 2 (2) (k) footnote 1.  
355 Article 10 (2) of the April 2004 Draft is set forth in brackets.  
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intellectual property rights other than copyrights and related rights. Examples are license 
agreements, agreements to assign an intellectual property right, and distribution contracts 
if they involve intellectual property.356 Infringement proceedings were also intended to be 
included in the convention. Therefore, the convention could apply in cases where the 
scope of an intellectual property right other than a copyright or copyright related right is 
in question. The bracketed language in sub – paragraph k) would only clarify this intent. 
The brackets are due to the fact that the negotiating parties could not agree on whether 
clarifying words with respect to this matter are necessary.357                    
 
4. Comments 
All of these facts, various approaches, suggestions, and thoughts raise multiple questions. 
Is it reasonable to exclude intellectual property matters completely from the scope of the 
proposed Hague Convention? Is an inclusion in part reasonable or does a later Hague 
Convention only make sense if all intellectual property rights are included in the 
framework of such a treaty? That this question cannot be answered in a way that provides 
an approach that is both clear in its application and accepted by all the different parties 
seems to be evident considering the controversial discussions up to this point. When the 
first draft of the Hague Convention, the Preliminary Draft Convention, was issued to the 
public, only copyrights were intended to be excluded from its scope. Now, after years of 
discussion copyrights are the only intellectual property rights that are still included in the 
most recent edition of the draft. 
                                                 
356 See December 2004 Draft Report, supra note 272 at paragraph 41. 
357 Id. at paragraph 42. 
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 In sum, two questions have to be answered. Does the Hague Convention really 
need intellectual property rights within its scope in order to be successful and 
meaningful? If yes, what types of intellectual property rights should be included? 
Professor Dreyfuss and Professor Ginsburg might be right in remarking that the 
application of intellectual property rights would be much easier if they are included in a 
convention that only covers intellectual property rights. However, they forget a very 
important point. Only the Hague Conference can offer the appropriate legal environment 
to draft a convention unifying law that is applicable and accepted worldwide. Universal 
application is exactly what judicial decisions on intellectual property need in order to 
achieve final and foreseeable outcomes. Intellectual property is one of the fields of law 
that does not take into consideration legal borders. Drafting a convention that is the 
perfect approach for only some delegations does not make sense in the long term. 
Therefore, the treatment of intellectual property rights has to be regulated under the 
umbrella of a regime that allows the participation of as many countries as possible. The 
Hague Conference can offer the negotiating environment that is necessary to draft such a 
convention. However, is it necessary to do so within the Hague Convention project?  The 
recent stage of the negotiations have shown that the project has lost much of its 
importance in view of the exclusion of certain important issues. Although there were 
reasons for these exclusions, every effort should be made to re-insert these pertinent 
issues. It is possible that at least some intellectual property matters will get included in a 
later convention. However, bracketed language in the April 2004 Draft still leaves doubts 
about this inclusion. Allowing the opportunity of including intellectual property matters 
to pass is unreasonable especially after the reduction of the scope of the convention to 
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choice of court clauses. Therefore, inclusion of intellectual property seems not only a 
reasonable consideration with respect to the unification of the law on choice of court 
clauses in intellectual property, but seems also to be of at least some importance for the 
overall recognition of the Hague Convention.  
Even after the reduction of the scope to choice of forum clauses, critics of the 
convention made remarks that demonstrated once more a completely wrong attitude 
towards the project. Some stated that even after the narrowing of the proposed convention 
there is still the likelihood that some troublesome issues will not disappear.358 Such 
statements demonstrate what was wrong with the project. Instead of trying to resolve 
troublesome issues and matters, some interest groups appeared to wish to avoid 
confrontation and consequently lost sight of the ultimate goal of the project and the “big 
picture.” The new narrow treaty can provide a proficient tool to establish reasonable 
intellectual property litigation. The approach that was initially suggested in the outcome 
of the second meeting of the Informal Working Group359 could be the proper way to 
solve the problem. The reduction to choice of court clauses opens the way to implement 
all intellectual property rights in a way that minimizes the danger of misuse of this 
inclusion. Concerns regarding the complete inclusion of intellectual property matters 
could be countered by excluding questions of validity from the scope of the convention. 
The latest draft has done that by including language that expressly states that any 
judgments rendered on the basis of a choice of court clause would not have any effect on 
the validity of certain intellectual property rights.  
                                                 
358 This statement was made by Judith Sapp representing the International Trademark Association. See 
Anandashankar Mazumdar, supra note 203.   
359 See supra part IV.B.3. 
 87 
Concerns were explicitly brought up with respect to trademarks. The International 
Trademark Organization believed that under the drafts that did not address the issue of 
the validity of trademarks, there was a danger that foreign courts that may not have any 
expertise in trademark matter could hear such matters: “What we would like and what we 
believe is essential for trademark owners is that only courts or agencies of a government 
in which the trademark arose should be able to determine whether a mark is entitled to 
registration there and whether a mark there has been infringed.”360 The idea that 
trademark law deserves more protection since it is territorial might be right, but to deny 
courts in other countries the ability to apply foreign rules to a given problem, or to 
investigate foreign rules seems unreasonable. Due to the highly connected markets today, 
applying foreign law in one’s own country is not unusual. The April 2004 Draft addresses 
these concerns and resolves the issue by including the described language with respect to 
the validity of trademarks among other intellectual property rights. Trademark law can 
now stay territorial and the danger of infringing persons using the issue of validity to 
obtain jurisdiction no longer exists since the scope of the convention was limited to 
choice of court agreements.  
There is one more open question with respect to the intellectual property issue. 
Should the scope of the Convention also cover matters regarding the validity of 
intellectual property rights other than copyrights and related rights if those are not raised 
as merely incidental questions? The main argument against an inclusion of proceedings to 
revoke an intellectual property right other than copyright and related rights would be 
similar to the one voiced by the International Trademark Organization: courts should not 
                                                 
360 See Sapp, supra note 358. 
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be able to decide about intellectual property rights that arose in another country. 
However, denying a court’s ability to resolve a case applying foreign law is not 
reasonable in the time of globalization. Furthermore, why does the draft convention 
imply that foreign courts are capable to decide on questions of validity if they arise as 
incidental questions but denies them this capability if the question would be the subject of 
the proceedings. If a court finds a patent to be invalid in an incidental question and 
renders a judgment on this ground, it does not make sense to give effect to the 
enforcement and recognition of this judgment without doing the same with respect to the 
incidental question as a separate or independent issues since the decision on the issue as 
an incidental question most likely influenced the outcome of the judgment. This example 
demonstrates that there is still much to discuss about regarding the inclusion of 
intellectual property in the Convention. It also demonstrates that a complete inclusion of 
all intellectual property matters is not as unlikely as many negotiators portray. However, 
as of the present situation a full inclusion of all intellectual property matters including 
questions of validity of patents and trademarks is not likely. Even if the June 2005 
Diplomatic Conference will not reach this result it will hopefully adopt standard set forth 
by the April 2004 Draft.      
 
 
B. E-Commerce  
The e-commerce issue was not expected to determine the negotiation process when the 
idea of negotiating a new Hague Convention arose. However, it soon became a 
significant issue. E-commerce took up a large portion of the time available for the 
negotiations, since the increasing importance of the internet and the rapidly advancing 
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technology could not be ignored.361 Transactions concluded over the internet were not an 
unusual phenomenon. In fact, everyone who is able to use the internet is able to 
participate in such transactions. This undoubtedly led to an increasing number of disputes 
arising out of transactions concluded over the internet. Against this background the 
drafters of the new convention realized that they have to address the e-commerce issue in 
order to keep the negotiations and their possible outcome up-to-date.362 This part of the 
thesis addresses the e-commerce issue by providing important information regarding the 
history and development of the negotiation process after reviewing the background of the 
rise of electronic commerce. The main focus will be on the e-commerce issue as it relates 
to consumer transactions.  
 
1.What is E-Commerce? 
The rise of e-commerce is due to the fact that the internet is accessible for nearly 
everyone for relatively little money. A person can access a world market in no time while 
sitting in an armchair in his living room. This has not only changed the way consumers 
think, behave and interact but it also modified the way business is conducted and changed 
how our society functions.363 One does not have to refer to statistics to realize the impact 
that the internet and e-commerce has had in recent years.364 In the 1990s under President 
                                                 
361 See Mary Shannon Martin, Keep it Online: The Hague Convention and the Need for Online Alternative 
Dispute Resolution in International Busines-to-Consumer E – Commerce, 20 B.U. INT’L L.J. 125, 127 
(2002).    
362 See Paul Hofheinz, Birth Pangs for Web Treaty Seem Endless, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2001, at A11. 
“Around the time the treaty writers sat down to work, the e-commerce sector took off. Suddenly, they 
found themselves trying to set global rules on how to regulate a new form of commerce that hardly 
recognized borders.“ Id.    
363 See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (1999). See also Martin, supra 
note 361 at 128. 
364 If one wants to call in statistics he would find out that the number of  merchants on the internet covering 
sales ranging from $100,000 to $10 million was expected to increase from 17,500 in 1999 to 2.6 million 
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Clinton, for instance, the United States strongly encouraged the development and 
expansion of e-commerce.365 A concrete result of the new attention given to this matter 
was the “Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act” signed by 
President Clinton in 2000.366 The new statute does not only recognize the validity of 
electronic contracts, electronic signatures, notices, and other electronic records, but also 
allows the involved parties to choose the technology they want to use for authenticating 
their transactions without any involvement by the government.367 This is only one 
example of modernization in this particular area in the United States.368  
There are two different types of e-commerce contracts or transactions that are 
important in the context discussed here, the so called business-to-business contracts and 
business-to-consumer contracts. Business-to-consumer e-commerce is “commerce using 
the internet to conduct business with consumers” which results in internet consumers 
buying or accessing information via the internet from business entities.369  Business-to-
consumer e-commerce contracts are concluded over the internet rather than by using the 
traditional face-to-face approach or mail media.370 Likewise, a business-to-business e-
                                                                                                                                                 
in 2004. Keenan Vision, The Keenan Report: The E – Merchant Opportunity of 1999 (Oct. 1, 1999), at 
http://www.keenanvision.com/doc/em-update/e-merchant_update.asp (last visited Jan. 22, 2004) 
[hereinafter: Keenan Report] Another source comes to the conclusion that the number of small- and 
medium-seized business on the internet has increased by 78% from 1999 to 2000 alone. eMarketer, The 
eGlobal Report 65 (2001), at http://www.ifc.org/sme/acrobat/eGlobal.pdf (last visited January 21, 
2005).      
365 See William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Jr., A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, Presidential 
Message to Internet Users (July 1, 1997), available at 
http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Commerce/message.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2005). 
366 Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 
464 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001). This Act was signed into law on June 30, 2000. Its provisions took 
effect on October 1, 2000. 
367 See id. 
368 For a summary of further developments in the U.S. law and politics see Martin, supra note 361 at 131 f. 
369 Daniel C. Eidsmoe, Online Dispute Resolution, 30 ILL. INST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 1, 3 (Aug. 
2001). 
370 Id.  
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commerce contract is a contract between two business entities concluded over the 
internet, for example.  
 
2. Existing Approaches to Consumer Contracts  
The following remarks give a short overview of the consumer protection provisions in 
Europe and in the USA. Pure consumer protection provisions will be described as well as 
such provisions that were exclusively made for the protection of consumers involved in 
e-commerce on the internet. 
 
a. The European Union  
Consumer protection rules in Europe relevant for e-commerce can be found in 
conventions and regulations as well as in specific directions on the matter.  
 
 i. Conventions  
Consumer protection has played a big role in the law of different countries in 
Europe371 and in the European Union.372 As mentioned above, the European Union 
adopted the 1968 Brussels Convention. The provisions of the Brussels Convention 
require physical presence in order to determine which court has jurisdiction. Only those 
claims that arise from that presence can be brought. It should be noted that the Rome 
                                                 
371 In Italy, for example, a choice of a forum other than the domicile of the consumer is assumed to be 
unfair and therefore unenforceable unless the seller presents evidence of an agreement with the 
consumer regarding this choice of forum. See Emilio Tosi, Consumer Protection under Italian Law, 
Chicago-Kent College of Law (Nov. 30, 1999), available at http://www.kentlaw.edu/cyberlaw/docs/ 
foreign/Italy-Tosi.html (last visited January 21, 2005). 
372 For example, with respect to consumer privacy the European Union follows a much more strict standard 
than the United States with its industry self regulation preference. See Council Directive 95/46/EC, 
1995 O.J. (L 281) 31. 
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Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations373 also includes provisions 
on cross-border conflicts that are relevant to electronic contracting by consumers.  
 
ii. EU Regulations   
The European Union member states soon realized that e-commerce was going to 
become more and more important not only for the industry but also for daily life. 
Therefore, in an attempt to support e-commerce in Europe the European Union’s Council 
of Ministers included some language regarding consumer contracts in the Brussels 
Regulation (Council Regulation No. 44/2001)374 which became effective in March 2002. 
According to this regulation the country in which the consumer resides will have 
jurisdiction over the dispute when a merchant “pursues commercial or professional 
activities in the member state of the consumer’s domicile, or by any means, directs such 
activities to that Member State.”375 In other words, consumers under the Brussels 
Regulation are now permitted to sue foreign operators of internet sites that market 
directly to the home country of the consumer in the consumer’s own courts. The 
consumer may choose where to sue his opponent while the consumer can only be sued at 
his domicile. A prior selection of a forum which is conflicting with these rules is not 
possible.376 The consequences are significant for sellers who want to sell their products 
online. They have to comply with the laws in all EU-member states in order to avoid suits 
                                                 
373  1998 O.J. (C 27) 34 (consolidated version). 
374 See supra note 25 art. 15-17. 
375 See id. art. 15 (1) lit. c. 
376 See Norbert Reich & Axel Halfmeier, Consumer Protection in the Global Village: Recent Developments 
in German and European Law, 106 DICK. L. REV. 111, 120 (2001).   
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by consumers.377 The difference between provisions in the new regulation and the 
Brussels Convention is found in the reach of consumer protection. While the Brussels 
Convention system was designed for the passive consumer, the new regulatory 
framework protects every consumer who enters in contractual contact with a supplier 
who is active in the consumer’s state of domicile. With respect to e-commerce it is 
therefore sufficient if there is an offer of goods or services contained on a web site that 
can be downloaded by the consumer on his computer.378 The level of protection offered 
to the consumer by this regulatory language is high, since all litigation in connection with 
consumer contracts that were entered into by means of e-commerce will take place in the 
consumer’s country of residence.379 An exception to this general principle can only be 
made if the consumer had chosen to do so by expressly stating that he preferred to litigate 
abroad.380 It seems important to point out, however, that these remarks are not relevant in 
a situation where the European consumer, living in a member country of the European 
Union, enters in contractual contact with suppliers from a non EU country like the United 
States, unless this supplier is acting through a European branch office or subsidiary.381     
                                                 
377 This burden on e-commerce retailers will be eased by the establishment of a system of alternative 
dispute resolution procedures that was envisioned by the European Union. See Paul Meller, Buyers 
Gain Online Rights in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, April 27, 2001, at W1. See also Nicole Goldstein, Brussels 
I: A Race to the Top, 2 CHI. J. INT’L LAW 521, 523 (2001).   
378 See Reich & Halfmeier, supra note 376 at 120. 
379 See id. 
380 See id.  
381 In this setting the consumer cannot profit from the protection normally offered to him by either the 
Brussels Convention or the Brussels Regulation. Rather, his domestic jurisdictional rules govern the 
legal relationship between him and his non EU contract partner. Taking a German consumer as an 
example, his or her domestic jurisdictional rules, included in the German Code of Civil Procedure 
(ZPO), would require certain special grounds for jurisdiction like the holding of assets of the U.S. 
defendant in Germany (§ 23 ZPO). This example demonstrates how weak the protection of the 
consumer can become: even if the German law would be applicable to the contract between the EU 
buyer and the non EU seller, § 29 ZPO would see the place of performance of the sellers obligation at 
his seat of business. That would lead to the application of the law of the country were the seller resides.    
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The Brussels Regulation was passed in the middle of the negotiations for the new 
Hague Convention. Instead of waiting for the outcome of the negotiations the European 
Union went ahead382 and thereby sent a message to the other delegations and to the 
United States in particular.383 Although the negotiations for the Hague Convention were 
not free of problems prior to the enactment of the Brussels Regulation they became more 
difficult thereafter.384 In the debate after the release of the Preliminary Draft Convention, 
which will be discuss later, the European Union often pointed out that they were not 
willing to change their existing approach to the consumer protection rules unless the 
change would include alternative dispute resolution mechanisms specifically online 
dispute resolution methods.385  
 
 iii. EU – Directives    
 Some EU directives are directly related to e-commerce consumer protection and 
will be described here to provide a more complete picture of the European approach to 
consumer protection. The first directive to be discussed is the Distance Selling 
Directive,386 which deals mainly with contracting through the World Wide Web or 
through e-mail.387 The limitation of this directive is that it does not apply to the area of 
financial services. However, this legal gap was closed by the Distance Marketing 
                                                 
382 The main reason for passing the regulation was, as indicated above, the new competence given to the 
European Union institutions by Art. 65 of the Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 24. 
383 See Martin, supra note 361 at 143. 
384 See Paul Meller, Europe Passes Stiff E – Commerce Law, THE STANDARD, Dec. 1, 2000.       
385 See Martin, supra note 361 at 143.  
386 Council Directive 97/7/EC, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19 [hereinafter: Distance Selling Directive]. One example 
for the implementation of the directive in the different member states of the European Union is the 
German “Fernabsatzgesetz” which contains specific provisions regarding information obligations, 
withdrawal and performance with respect to contracts that were concluded at a distance. See 
Fernabsatzgesetz, 2000 Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Gazette, BGBl.) I 897. See also Reich & Halfmeier, 
supra note 376 at 114.     
387 See J. DICKIE, INTERNET AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW IN THE EU 91 – 100 (1999). 
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Directive388 which was adopted by the European Parliament and the European Council on 
September 23, 2002 almost four years after it was initially proposed.389 Another directive 
that is related to the e-commerce protection matter is Directive 2000/31/EC on “Certain 
Legal Aspects of Information Society Services in the Internal Market,” usually referred to 
as “Directive on Electronic Commerce.”390 This directive addresses internal market 
aspects and is therefore not as concerned with consumer protection.391    
 
b. United States 
While there are a number of e-consumer protection provisions in the European legal 
system, the U.S. is often referred to as less advanced in this area.392 Because of a lack of 
consumer protection provisions, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) along with various 
other trade agencies apply traditional law to the current problems of the internet.393    
 In U.S. law one has to look at state statutes and case law when searching for 
provisions regarding e-commerce transactions. While state enactments of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) apply to transactions involving goods, services are governed by 
the common law of the various states. Transactions involving digital information, on the 
other hand, are governed by state enactments of the Uniform Computer Information 
Transaction Act (UCITA).394 The UCITA is a draft model law applying to computer 
                                                 
388 Council Directive 2002/65/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 271) 16-24. 
389 See 1998 O.J. (C 385) 10. See also Reich & Halfmeier, supra note 376 at 130. 
390 Council Directive 2000/31/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1. 
391 In detail the Directive on e – commerce regulates, besides other issues, the free access of EU-based 
providers to e-commerce, it includes provisions regarding the conclusion of electronic contracts and 
commercial communications. For more information regarding this directive see Reich & Halfmeier, 
supra note 376 at 130 ff.  
392 See, e.g., Michael Cordera, E – Consumer Protection: A Comparative Analysis of EU and US Consumer 
Protection on the Internet, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 231, 251 (2001).     
393 Id. at 252.  
394 See id.  
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information transactions, which is highly controversial because of its unifying 
provisions.395 It was approved and recommended for state adoption by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in July 1999. In particular, the 
UCITA regulates agreements to create, modify, transfer or distribute computer software, 
computer data and databases as well as internet and online information.396 This law is 
controversial and has only been enacted in two states thus far.397 Further enactments by 
other states is unforeseeable at this point.398 The controversy exists because there is no 
agreement on whether the UCITA actually increases consumer protection. While some 
academics hold the view that there is a lack of appropriate consumer protection 
provisions in the UCITA,399 others refer to it as expanding consumer protection in the 
United States.400 
If a state has not adopted the UCITA rules, most of the transactions involving any 
kind of digital information are covered by the UCC as transactions involving goods.401 
Despite the fact that parties contract entirely over the internet, they do not lose protection 
by the UCC since §§ 2-204 and 2-206 do not require formal rules for offer and 
acceptance.402 In addition, the Statute of Frauds and the Parole Evidence Rule are also 
applicable to sales conducted on the internet.403   
                                                 
395 See Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act 
(July 23-30, 1999), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/cita10st.htm (last visited 
January 21, 2005). 
396 See Raymond T. Nimmer, Contract Law in Electronic Commerce, 587 PRAC. L. INST. 1127, 1133 ff. 
(2000).   
397 These two states are Maryland and Virginia. 
398 See generally  Brian D. McDonald, The Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act, 16 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 461 (2001). 
399 See id. at 462. 
400 See Nimmer, supra note 396. 
401 Id. at 1133 ff. 
402 See GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUDA, LAW OF THE INTERNET § 9.02 [c], at 9-31 (1998). 
403 See id. at § 9 at 3-46. 
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3. Article 7, Preliminary Draft Convention  
The drafters of the first Preliminary Draft Convention of 1999404 could not avoid 
including a provision involving language resolving problems related to e-commerce. 
What Article 12 of the Preliminary Draft Convention was for intellectual property, 
Article 7 of the Preliminary Draft Convention was for the e-commerce.405 This provision 
covers contracts concluded by consumers and therefore raised obvious questions 
regarding e-commerce.406 Paragraph 3 of the provision, which basically stated that a 
forum selection clause conflicting with the language in Article 7 of the Preliminary Draft 
Convention would not be valid was the subject of much discussion. First, it was claimed 
that Article 7, paragraph 3 could lead to a lack of predictability in connection with 
electronic consumer contracts since it does not recognize choice of court clauses that are 
entered into prior to a dispute.407 However, this is the same in the Council Regulation No. 
44/2001.408 The problems did not lay in the details of paragraph 3. Rather, the whole 
provision received harsh criticism from some delegations at the negotiations. Once again, 
the United States Department of State objected to the approach in Article 7 Preliminary 
                                                 
404 See supra note 61. 
405 See id. art. 7. 
406 Article 7 of the Preliminary Draft Convention (“Contracts Concluded by Consumers“) reads as follows: 
“1. A plaintiff who concluded a contract for a purpose which is outside its trade or profession, hereafter 
designated as the consumer, may bring a claim in the courts of the State in which it is habitually 
resident, if a) the conclusion of the contract on which the claim is based is related to trade or 
professional activities that the defendant has engaged in or directed to that State, in particular in 
soliciting business through means of publicity, and b) the consumer has taken the steps necessary for 
the conclusion of the contract in that State. 2. A claim against the consumer may only be brought by a 
person who entered into the contract in the course of its trade or profession before the courts of the State 
of the habitual residence of the consumer. 3. The parties to a contract within the meaning of paragraph 1 
may, by an agreement which conforms with the requirements of Article 4, make a choice of court a) if 
such agreement is entered into after the dispute has arisen, or b) to the extend only that it allows the 
consumer to bring proceedings in another court.”    
407 See Brand, supra note 35 at 597. 
408 See Council Regulation No. 44/2001, supra note 25. 
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Draft Convention and made this clear in a letter to the Hague Conference.409 In this letter 
Jeffrey Kovar, then the head of the American delegation, claimed that Article 7 of the 
Preliminary Draft Convention “raised a storm of controversy in the electronic commerce 
world.”410 The e-commerce and internet communities in the U.S. expressed concerns over 
the approach included in the draft and publicly announced their disagreements with the 
draft Convention’s jurisdictional framework in articles of major U.S. newspapers and 
other magazines.411 Why this storm of controversy broke out in the United States is not 
clear to everyone.412 One of the main concerns expressed was the fear that the Hague 
Convention would allow copyright owners to look for courts abroad whose judgments 
would satisfy their needs and then return to the United States to seek enforcement of 
these judgments where a different approach to the same laws might exist.413  
The fear of the e-commerce world in the U.S. can be barely understood. Even 
without the Hague Convention, American e-commerce suppliers already have to deal 
with cases in where they are sued by customers from around the world. Local procedural 
rules make this possible. Only one example is the decision by a French Court which 
imposed criminal liability against Yahoo! and Yahoo! France.414 Yahoo! had sold Nazi 
material to French citizens, and although the material in question was available only for 
auction on Yahoo!’s auction sites in the United States the French court declared that it 
                                                 
409 See supra note 68.   
410 Id. 
411 See, e.g., Christopher Stern, Copyright Holders vs. Telecoms; Interests Clash in Debate on Regulating 
Global Commerce, WASH. POST, May 16, 2001; see also Tied Up in Knots, ECONOMIST, June 9, 2001.   
412 See, e.g., Reich & Halfmeier, supra note 376 at 122.  
413 See Stern, supra note 411.  
414 See Mahasti Razavi & Thaima Samman, Yahoo! And Limitations of the Global Village, 19 SPG. COMM. 
LAW 27, 27 (2001); see also Eric T. Eberwine, Sound And Fury Signifying Nothing?: Jürgen Büssow’s 
Battle Against Hate – Speech On The Internet, 1 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 353, 370 ff. (2004-2005).    
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had jurisdiction.415 It has become clear for internet and e-commerce companies in general 
and for American internet and e-commerce companies in particular that there may not 
longer be protection against liability abroad for actions that were legally taken at home.416  
Since American e-commerce suppliers are already subject to suits filed abroad, a 
future Hague Convention covering e-commerce would not increase the threat for U.S. e-
commerce. On the contrary, it would help to harmonize the law in this particular field 
because the U.S. e-commerce industry is not the only industry already confronted with 
suits brought elsewhere. European e-commerce suppliers face the same problem. Long-
arm statutes and the so called “minimum contracts doctrine” make them subjects to suits 
initiated in the United States.  
The general statement by the United States delegation was that it would be 
impossible for the U.S. to adopt rules, in the context of Article 7 of the Preliminary Draft 
Convention, which would require businesses to be subject to suit in the courts of a 
consumer’s country of residence. In particular, the United States had problems with the 
way the text of the Convention addressed choice of forum clauses. Stating that Article 7 
of the proposed Convention would “create an absolute rule against choice of forum 
clauses in consumer contracts” they made clear what their position was and also gave the 
reason for why they opposed the approach in Article 7 Preliminary Draft Convention.417 
In contending that it was not possible for the U.S. to agree to a choice of an exclusive in 
the draft convention, the United States delegation furthermore emphasized that such a 
                                                 
415 Yahoo! was ordered to restrict the availability of the Nazi material by French citizens. A $12,000 fine 
per day was issued for the case that Yahoo! refused to comply with the French court’s order. Id.     
416 Id.  
417 E-mail from Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law, U.S. Dep’t of 
State, to James Love, Consumer Project on Technology (Oct. 26, 2000), available at 
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/random-bits/2000-October/000450.html (last visited January 22, 
2005). 
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provision contradicted domestic U.S. law since the choice of law approach in the UCITA 
was the complete opposite to Article 7 Preliminary Draft Convention.418  
 In recent domestic cases, U.S. courts pointed out that if a company does business 
via its web site in a consumer’s home state it should expect to be sued in that state. These 
courts thus made web site owners subject to suit in consumer home states in the event of 
an alleged breach of contract.419 Why then does the U.S. Supreme Court decline to 
subject web site owners to suits in other countries when the same owners could be sued in 
many other different states within the U.S.?420 Not considering differences in judicial 
systems, is there a difference between the distance between a consumer on the west coast 
and a website owner on the east coast in the U.S. and the distance between a web site 
owner in Vancouver, Canada and a consumer living in Seattle? Against the background 
of these considerations the point of view of the U.S. delegation in the Hague negotiations 
appears to contradict the recent trend by U.S. courts. 421  
There are further arguments that do not support the position of the U.S. 
delegation. One can argue about the reasonableness of expecting a U.S. plaintiff, who is a 
consumer in the state of Washington to travel across the country to sue a supplier situated 
in Florida.422 However, one can normally not expect a consumer to go to another country 
                                                 
418 Id. 
419 See, e.g., Tech Heads, Inc. v. Desktop Serv. Ctr., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (D. Or. 2000); Sports Authority 
Michigan, Inc. v. Justballs, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 806 (E.D. Mich. 2000); Colt Studio, Inc. v. Badpuppy 
Enterprise, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
420 See Martin, supra note 361 at 146. 
421 See Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 204-05 (Tex. App. 2001); America Online, Inc. 
v. Booker, 781 So. 2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 
528, 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); Decker v. Circus Circus Hotel, 49 F. Supp. 2d 743, 748 
(D.N.J. 1999); Groff v. America Online, Inc., No. PC 97-0331, 1998 WL 307001 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 
27, 1998). 
422 See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
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in order to sue the supplier.423 The international setting is not only special because of the 
problem with long distances. Other problems like language, increased costs for suits, and 
less knowledge about the foreign legal system come in on the consumer side. These 
problems may also appear on the supplier’s side. However, apart from one-man 
businesses the supplier side of the contractual relationship seems to have the greater 
financial ability to face the problems of litigating abroad.   
  
4. The June 2001 Diplomatic Conference 
The drafters of the Preliminary Draft Convention knew that the approach with respect to 
e-commerce was not good enough to cover all the problems this issue would bring about. 
Proof for this is a solitary footnote to the Preliminary Draft Convention, which 
announced an upcoming meeting by a group of specialists in early 2000.424 The Hague 
Conference realized that there was plenty to do before the June 2001 Diplomatic 
Conference. The first meeting on the issue was held from February 28 to March 1 in 2000 
in Ottawa, Canada. The summary of the outcome of the Ottawa Meeting was simple and 
obvious. The experts stated that Article 7 of the Preliminary Draft Convention was not 
appropriate for application to business-to-consumer contracts since it “[...] was prepared 
without taking account of the issues relating to electronic commerce.”425 The problems in 
the business-to-consumer setting became the essential point of the entire negotiation 
process. This fact is the main reason why the e-commerce issue became so important. 
                                                 
423 See SCOLES & HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 369 (2d ed., 1992). 
424 Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61 at n.1. 
425 Catherine Kessedjian, Electronic Commerce and International Jurisdiction, Preliminary Document No. 
12 of August 2000 at 6, available at ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/jdgmpd12.doc (last visited Jan. 22, 2004) 
[hereinafter: Preliminary Document No. 12].  
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However, the internet made e-commerce and the business-to-consumer relationships 
inseparable.  
Although the experts detected weak points in the Preliminary Draft Convention 
with respect to e-commerce, they expressly pointed out in the conclusion of their report 
that there was no suggestion of excluding e-commerce from the scope of a later treaty.426 
On the contrary, many experts held the opinion that every necessary measure should be 
taken to “adapt the convention to the needs of e-commerce”427 in a way that guarantees 
certainty and predictability.428 The participants of the Ottawa meeting acknowledged a 
series of problems they had with the draft. Two issues they had with Article 7 of the 
Preliminary Draft Convention are summarized below.  
 The report expressly pointed out disagreement with the approach in Article 7 (1) 
of the Preliminary Draft Convention dealing with the requirements for the consumer to 
institute proceedings in the courts of his habitual residence. While the first condition in 
subparagraph a) will always be met in an e-commerce setting, the second condition in 
subparagraph b) causes more trouble. In order to use the courts of his habitual residence 
for the settlement of conflicts with the other contract party, the consumer “must have 
taken the necessary steps to conclude the contract in his state of residence.”429 However, 
modern means of telecommunication make it possible for its users to access it nearly 
everywhere in the world. Contracts can be concluded in a place different from the 
habitual residence of the user who is usually a consumer.430 This fact, however, carries no 
                                                 
426 Id. at 11.   
427 Id. 
428 Id. 
429 Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, art. 7 (1) (b).   
430 Preliminary Document No. 12, supra note 425 at 6. 
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“special implication for the purpose of deciding which courts have jurisdiction.”431 But 
what does it mean to “conclude a contract in another place”? Is the contract really 
concluded in the place where the consumer uses the facilities to go on the internet? Is it 
not rather concluded on the internet itself? But was is the internet? Is it what everybody 
usually confers to as Cyberspace? But what is cyberspace and is there a justification to 
speak of a jurisdiction that is unique for the cyberspace that can be separated from other 
types of jurisdiction?432 
The next important problem the participants of the Ottawa meeting had with the 
draft was the language of Article 7 (3) Preliminary Draft Convention creating a 
conservative approach to choice of court clauses. It was pointed out that previous 
discussions of the Special Commission suggested “that a consumer who is fully informed 
of his rights could decide to forgo the protection available under Article 7 and opt instead 
for a choice of court clause.”433 Regarding the validity of such choice of court clauses the 
report of the Ottawa meeting followed the initiative of the American Bar Association434 
and picked up the approach of the Geneva Round Table435 on the same issue. This round 
table suggested to accept pre-dispute choice of court clauses as valid if the law of the 
consumer’s habitual residence treated them as valid.436 Even though there was no 
                                                 
431 Id. 
432 See generally Juliet M. Oberding & Terje Norderhaug, A Separate Jurisdiction for Cyberspace?, 2 J. OF 
COMPUTER – MEDIATED COMM. 1 (June, 1996), available at 
http://www.ascusc.org./jcmc/vol2/issue1/juris.html (last visited January 22, 2005) (arguing that 
cyberspace is some kind of community that is capable of its own community norms and is currently 
forming them). 
433 Preliminary Document No. 12, supra note 425 at 7. 
434 See Martin, supra note 361 at 139. 
435 Catherine Kessedjian, International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, Preliminary Document No. 7 of April 1997, available at ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/jdgm_pd7.doc 
[hereinafter: Preliminary Document No. 7]. 
436 Id. 
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consensus regarding this issue, the door for the enforcement of pre-dispute choice of 
court clauses seemed to be left open.437 
These problems and all other open questions in connection with them demonstrate 
only a small portion of the difficulties that the discussions regarding Article 7 of the 
Preliminary Draft Convention in the e-commerce context had to face during the Ottawa 
meeting.438Another meeting on the same issue had been held from February 26 to March 
1 in 2001. The outcome of both meetings resulted in a new approach to Article 7, which 
was negotiated at the June 2001 Diplomatic Conference.439 The lack of consensus among 
the different delegations is illustrated in the number of alternatives in Article 7 of the 
Interim Text. Each of the four alternatives would lead in a different direction. The 
number of alternatives proliferated to such an extend, that even the exclusion of e-
commerce was suggested.440   
 
5. Later Discussions and Developments   
After the June 2001 Diplomatic Conference the negotiating parties realized that they had 
to begin anew in order to succeed in adopting a final convention, and thus, focused on 
choice of court agreements in business-to-business contracts as addressed above. Due to 
the highly controversial discussion about consumer contracts related to e-commerce, 
contracts involving at least one consumer were excluded from the scope of the treaty, and 
the issue of jurisdiction to hear e-commerce and other internet related disputes were 
moved to the so called second stage of the negotiations. “Second stage issues” are to be 
                                                 
437 See Martin, supra note 361 at 139. 
438 For a complete summary of all the remarks to Article 7 that were made in the report see supra note 425 
at 6 ff.   
439 Interim Text, supra note 178, art. 7.  
440 Id. at footnote 43.  
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on the agenda for negotiations after a final Hague Convention is adopted. The current 
April 2004 Draft excludes consumer contracts from its scope, and thus does not offer any 
changes for consumers. Therefore, contracts involving consumers will continue to be 
treated in Europe and the United States as has been described above.441  
One of the tasks of this thesis has been to analyze whether an exclusion of 
business-to-consumer contracts from the scope of the Convention is reasonable, and what 
impact the inclusion or exclusion would have on consumer protection. In discussing these 
problems two different questions have to be distinguished. Firstly, is it reasonable to 
completely exclude consumer contracts from the scope of the Convention? Secondly, is 
the current style of the convention which focuses on choice of court agreements suitable 
for the consumer issue? 
As far as the first question is concerned, the essential point seems to be that even 
if the Convention does not include consumer contracts and business-to-consumer e-
commerce transactions, such a treaty would nonetheless be a great step toward 
unification in the field of law discussed here.442 However, the appropriateness of such a 
step may be doubted. Examples already given above demonstrate that in some parts of 
the world, consumer protection in the e-commerce sector is not well-developed. The 
United States is a good example to demonstrate that this is not only true for less 
developed countries, but also for those regions of the world where consumer protection 
and e-consumer transaction protection are being discussed.  
Furthermore, even regions with high consumer protection standards face 
uncertainty and unpredictability in the age of the internet. Since the internet connects 
                                                 
441 See supra part VI.B.2.a. and b. 
442 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 361 at 159. 
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individuals, businesses, and markets all over the world, the consumer protection in these 
particular regions reaches its limits. For instance, if a consumer in Sienna, Italy buys a 
new camera via the internet from a supplier in the U.S. and has problems with the product 
later, the Brussels Regulation does not help him if he wants to sue the supplier. In the 
long term, situations like this will put off consumers from contracting via the internet 
since they face uncertainties that do not exist in situations where the product is bought in 
a retail store. It is clear that such a scenario would not even be in the interest of the 
delegations that oppose the inclusion of business-to-consumer contracts into the Hague 
Convention. Even though choice of court clauses in business-to-business contracts is an 
important matter, they have not been the principle concern of the Hague drafters.   
In 2004, 10% of the United States economy was represented by transactions by 
small businesses using e-merchant technology.443 This underlines the importance of the 
language in the April 2004 Draft. There can be no doubt that the convention in its current 
version would do a great deal in terms of predictability and uniformity with respect to 
choice of court clauses in e-commerce transactions in the business-to-business setting. On 
the other hand, it must be clear that at least most of the small business transactions in 
some way involve transactions with consumers. Most of these businesses completely 
depend on the relationship to consumers to whom they offer goods and services. 
Concentrating on regional markets within the various nations is one way to look at the 
problem. Another way is to face the problem with eyes looking through international 
glasses. From the American perspective, pan-European and international networks are 
evolving and provide new grounds for e-merchant services that would create new jobs 
                                                 
443 Keenan Report, supra note 364. 
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and other opportunities for the American market. Therefore, growing consumer interest 
and good regulatory control can only be in the best interest of the U.S. This is one reason 
why the consumer issue should have been included in the scope of the contract. As the 
discussions above have shown, the gap between the different points of views would not 
be so great if the influence from factors outside the legal field did not receive too much 
consideration. It seems that industry interests often play a role that is not balanced by a 
lobby representing consumers. The United States clearly highly influential in the 
negotiations. While there had been extensive business sector involvement in the 
negotiations of the Hague Convention,444 consumer advocacy groups were only briefed 
on the draft Convention one week before the February 2000 Ottawa meeting.445 
Furthermore, America’s most influential consumer group, The Consumer Project on 
Technology (CPTech)446 was not allowed to attend the Hague negotiations as a part of the 
American delegation.447 Even though this situation has changed somewhat in the recent 
history of the negotiations, one could argue that had there been more involvement by 
consumer groups from the beginning the exclusion of consumer contracts from the scope 
of the convention would have been prevented.  
 Assuming that the negotiators try to add consumer contracts to the scope of the 
convention, the issue then becomes how this can be done under a convention that focuses 
                                                 
444 See James Love, Meeting in Ottawa on the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, Consumer Project on Technology, available at 
http://www.cptech.org/ecom/hague-march-2000.html (last visited January 22, 2005).  
445 Id. 
446 The Consumer Project on Technology (CPTech) is a U.S. consumer advocacy group formed by Ralph 
Nader. This group actively participates in the discussions regarding the Hague Convention. CPTech has 
always opposed notions that would take away the consumers right to bring legal action in their own 
country. General information about the work of this group regarding the Hague Convention and other 
projects can be found at http://www.cptech.org. 
447 See Love, supra note 444 at 1. It was pointed out that while CPTech as a representative of consumers 
was not a part of the U.S. delegation an employee from Disney was.  
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on choice of court agreements. While the supporter of the consumer side do not favor 
choice of law provisions in consumer contracts, the business lobby would do everything 
to include them in the convention. The reasons for these opposing viewpoints are 
clarified through the following example. In dealing with the public, the Microsoft 
Corporation established a practice that faced the consumers with ‘take it or leave it 
contracts.’ According to this policy, consumers must either accept King County, 
Washington, the seat of the Microsoft Corporation, as the place whose courts will resolve 
all the disputes regarding the contract between the parties, or decline the contractual 
relation with Microsoft.448 The establishment of a regime that enforces choice of court 
clauses in consumer contracts would not only give “big players” in the business sector the 
opportunity to put pressure on consumers. If consumers are not automatically able to 
bring suit in the courts of their home countries, choice of court clauses will become a tool 
for medium and smaller businesses where they can take away the protection consumers 
need due to their weaker position.  
A reasonable approach seems to be the one of the Brussels Regulation. It states 
that the consumer may choose were to sue the opposing party while the consumer can 
only be sued at his or her domicile. It also forbids a prior selection of a forum which 
conflicts with these rules. This could be the biggest problem considering the limitation of 
the present draft to choice of court agreements. However, it is important to establish such 
or similar approaches in e-commerce consumer transaction cases. In these cases, the 
already weak position of the consumer is weakened even further since the e-commerce 
consumer bears the additional risk of the pre-payment requirement that is typical for a 
                                                 
448 See id. at 2. 
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setting such as this one. The most influential international consumer group called the 
Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD)449 points out this fact. It also adds that this 
fact is only one reason why the seller or supplier will normally have little reason to sue 
the consumer.450 Therefore, not permitting consumers to bring suit in the courts of their 
home countries would mean “denying them their right to redress.”451 TACD further 
argues that a choice of forum clause in a consumer contract should not be enforceable, 
and that the Hague Convention must include language that creates the right for the 
consumer to sue the business in the courts of the consumer’s home country.452  
Only a Hague Convention that includes consumer contracts in general and 
guarantees the possibility for the consumer to sue in the courts of his home country will 
in the long term provide the right background not only for regular consumer transactions 
but also for e-commerce consumer transactions. The adoption of a Brussels Regulation 
style approach in a Hague Convention would surely lead to great opposition. However, 
most of the arguments against the inclusion of language that is similar to that in the 
Brussels Regulation is unfounded as addressed above and often bases on the influence of 
different interest groups. Against the background that most of the e-commerce 
transactions are typically of small monetary value, the additional establishment of 
alternative dispute resolution schemes would also be a reasonable addition to the 
                                                 
449 The Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue issued a paper in February 2000 titled “Jurisdiction in Cross – 
Border Consumer Contracts,“ see Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue, Jurisdiction on Cross – Border 
Consumer Contracts, Doc. No. Ecom-15-00 (Feb. 2000), available at http://www.tacd.org/cgi-
bin/db.cgi?page=view&config=admin/docs.cfg&id=44 (last visited January 22, 2005). 
450 Id.   
451 Id.  
452 Id.  
 110 
convention.453 Major changes would be necessary in order to include consumer contracts 
in the way proposed above. Since the negotiating parties already have problems adopting 
a convention with a very limited scope, one can have doubts whether the goal of 
including consumer contracts will be reached in the negotiations of second stage issues if 
there should be such negotiations later.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
453 This issue is heatedly discussed among scholars, practitioners, and different groups like the TACD. 
Many writers come to the conclusion that a Hague Convention without alternative dispute resolution 
schemes would not succeed in practice. See, e.g., Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue, Resolution on the 
Proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
Doc. No. Ecom 22-01 May 2001), available at http://www.tacd.org/cgi-
bin/db.cgi?page=view&config=admin/docs.cfg&id=94 (last visited January 22, 2005).  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Hague Convention Project is over a decade old, while the idea of drafting a 
convention with such content is even older. There are not many existing legal projects 
that have such a long history and that have changed their content so often and so 
dramatically. The reason for such extensive modifications is that all participating nations 
and interest groups have had much influence on the project. The drafting process is not 
yet over. Thus, drawing a conclusion seems premature. It is important, however, to 
summarize what has been done so far and what should be done in the future.  
 The thesis made clear that the drafting process started out with an approach that 
was very similar to the Brussels Convention and the Brussels Regulation (Council 
Regulation No. 44/2001). However, the U.S. especially opposed such an approach for the 
Hague Convention Project even though it was working well among the European states 
for decades and provided a functioning system with respect to consumer protection. The 
result of the unwillingness of the U.S. to adopt a Convention with a broad scope is a draft 
that only applies in international cases to exclusive choice of court agreements concluded 
in civil and commercial matters in the business-to-business setting. A narrow choice of 
court convention in the business-to-business setting is a good start, but it disregards the 
original goal of the Hague Conference. As described above, the proposed Convention 
neither covers intellectual property matters nor e-commerce. 
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 The short-term goal of the negotiations of the Hague Convention is clear. In June 
2005 the delegations will gather for a Diplomatic Conference. The result of this 
Diplomatic Conference could be a Hague Convention that is ready to be signed and 
ratified by the member states. Even if the negotiations last longer there is little danger 
that the project will fail. The first step of drafting any convention, even a very narrow one 
is the most important one. It will be the basis for further fine-tuning with respect to 
second stage matters. If the negotiating parties subsequently broaden the convention, they 
will have taken a desirable direction by starting small. 
With respect to the second stage, it is evident that drafting a convention that is 
intended to be accepted universally is not an easy task. However, this fact should not be 
an excuse for excluding matters where regulation is not only important for the legal field 
but also in the daily lives of the people. Progress with respect to the technical matters that 
concern our daily activities has to be framed by laws and regulations that can face the 
challenges of the twenty-first century without being outdated and impractical. The Hague 
Conference could both be a tool to obtain proper jurisdiction by assigning disputes to the 
right court and a means of making sure that judicial decisions are subject to recognition 
and enforcement elsewhere. These objections are especially important in the two areas 
that were subject to detailed discussion in this paper, namely intellectual property and e-
commerce. 
There can only be unification with respect to the intellectual property area if it is 
included in a treaty on jurisdiction and enforcement that provides for as many nations as 
possible to participate. While some could argue whether a separate convention on the 
matter is more reasonable, the answer to this problem is clear. The Hague Convention is 
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the ideal tool to unify the rules regarding jurisdiction, recognition, and enforcement in the 
intellectual property arena. Only the inclusion of all intellectual property rights in the 
convention including questions of validity will provide certainty in the application and 
use of this area of law. Intellectual property rights are closely connected with contractual 
matters, for example. Therefore, a common treatment in one convention regulating 
jurisdiction and recognition of judgments is not only reasonable but necessary. 
 In summary of the remarks regarding the e-commerce matter, it must be pointed 
out that while a great deal has been done regarding business-to-business transactions the 
additional inclusion of business-to-consumer relationships must be a major goal in the 
second stage negotiations. The importance of the Hague Convention project will diminish 
considerably if the business-to-consumer transactions are not included in its scope. If the 
Hague Convention project wants to have a long lasting impact, it must include business-
to-consumer contracts in the scope of the convention. Without this step, consumers all 
over the world will become increasingly unprotected in a society of proliferating e-
commerce. The only possibility to react is once more the Hague Convention. In facing 
the challenges that new technologies create, countries should subordinate their national 
interests under the broader idea of a regime that can lead to predictability, certainty, and 
protection for weaker parties worldwide.  
  Without the inclusion of intellectual property rights and business-to-consumer e-
commerce transaction issues into its scope, the Hague Convention, which is already 
weakened by the narration of the treaty to choice of court clauses, will lose further 
importance in the long run and face the danger of becoming meaningless. However, it is 
not too late and the negotiations in the proposed second stage should make use of the 
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foundation that will hopefully be created by the adoption of a new Hague Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Convention after the June 2005 Diplomatic Conference. The second stage 
negotiations will decide whether the project remains to be a small fish in the legal 
aquarium or whether it grows to be one of the most important and biggest projects in 
years. It is certainly possible to achieve the later alternative and to create a Hague 
Convention that is acceptable worldwide. The adoption of a convention that is similar to 
the April 2004 Draft after the June 2005 Diplomatic Conference would be a big step 
towards a later Hague Convention with a wider scope. The drafting of such a wide 
convention that includes all the approaches suggested in this thesis will depend on 
whether the negotiating parties gather again to discuss the inclusion of second stage 
issues after the adoption of a Convention in the April 2004 Draft style in June 2005. 
Whether such negotiations will take place in the near future, however, can be drawn into 
doubt since the parties had severe problems to even agree on a Convention in the present 
form. The history of the negotiations behind the creation of the April 2004 Draft makes 
this approach to an inflexible framework that is difficult to change. Hopefully, the 
delegations did not miss the historic chance for drafting a broad treaty by favoring the 
present approach. However, the present draft can be a good starting point for something 
bigger, if delegations work together in a serious attempt to face the legal challenges that 
are caused by our modern times.        
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